

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

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November 17, 1958

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# Bulletin

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# Canada and the United States: Mutual Interests and Ideals

*Remarks by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

On behalf of President Eisenhower I congratulate The Pilgrims of the United States on this dinner in honor of the distinguished Prime Minister of Canada [John Diefenbaker]. We thank you, sir, for having consented to be with us and to address us. We are always eager to hear from the Head of Government of the great nation that is our neighbor to the north.

For my part, I shall take only a few moments to recall some of the basic reasons why our two countries work together in the world in close association. This association is, of course, not exclusive. For example, Canada has the association represented by the British Commonwealth of Nations, which is one of the great forces for peace, freedom, and stability in the world. And we too have various international associations.

## **The Atlantic Community**

But to turn to the association of Canada and the United States, I first note that we are both Atlantic Ocean countries. It is of the utmost importance to both of us that the other side of the Atlantic should be in the hands of the nations that are our friends—indeed, more than friends. Canada and the United States have historic and precious ties with the United Kingdom. From it each of us has derived its independence and much of its political, social, and juridical fabric.

Our peoples have bonds of race, religion, and culture with many of the peoples of Europe. Together with them we form part of an international community, often called the Atlantic Community. It is the product of centuries of striving and sacri-

fice for human freedom and welfare. It is the principal exponent of what is often called Western or Judeo-Christian civilization. The members of that Community are determined to stay strong and united. Their purpose is now manifested most significantly by the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization. Under this treaty there has developed a powerful military establishment, to which all the members contribute. There is also the permanent North Atlantic Council, which provides a forum where the worldwide foreign policies of the members are discussed. There is thus developing a practice of consultation on foreign policy that is unique.

Never before have so many nations worked together so intimately in the realm of peaceful political effort. Each, proud of its independence, recognizes that, under present conditions, independence can be preserved only by the practice of interdependence.

All of the members of NATO have contributed to building this novel and significant peacetime structure. But it can be said without fear of contradiction that special contributions have been made by Canada and by the United States. Thus we work side by side to preserve the Atlantic Community, not merely as a relic from the past but as a dynamic force adapting itself to new conditions so as to preserve its capacity to serve both its own people and the welfare of mankind.

## **Security of the Western Pacific**

Each of our countries has also developed from east to west to become Pacific as well as Atlantic nations. As such, it is of the utmost importance to us that the Pacific Ocean, like the Atlantic

<sup>1</sup> Made before The Pilgrims of the United States at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 28 (press release 646).

Ocean, should remain a friendly ocean, with its further shores held by governments which belong to the free world. It would be grave for both of us if the Sino-Soviet bloc were to succeed in its announced purpose to expel Western influence and strength from the western Pacific and to organize that area in hostility to us.

So far there is no comprehensive organization of the free-world countries of the Pacific comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which serves the Atlantic Community. There is the eight-nation Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and the United States has bilateral security treaties with the Republics of the Philippines, Korea, and China, and with Japan. While Canada has preferred not to join in collective-defense arrangements or treaty responsibility involving the securing of the western Pacific, we know that that does not indicate any lack of Canadian concern about the Pacific. Canada contributed significantly to the United Nations forces which fought in Korea, and Canada serves on the international commission in Indochina. Canadian sympathy, understanding, and association with the security problems of the Far East, although not formalized, are nonetheless real.

#### **Significance of the Arctic Area**

Then there is the Arctic Ocean. Northern Canada and our new State, Alaska, hold a contiguous frontier along that ocean. The other side of that ocean, unhappily, is held by forces that are not friendly. That polar area assumes great significance in this age of jet planes, missiles, and nuclear weapons. Our two countries are no longer separated from a potential enemy by the vast reaches of friendly oceans and friendly nations to the east and to the west. The Arctic area, until recently an impenetrable defensive barrier, now constitutes a zone that is easily and rapidly traversed. Today the contiguous frontiers of Canada and the United States in the north constitute a front line of defense. It is probably the line that any enemy would first seek to breach in the event of general war.

We have tried to make of this northern area one where there would be international inspection to reduce the risk of surprise attack. Last April the Soviet Union complained of what, in fact, were nonexistent alert flights by United States bombers in the northern area. In response the

United States and Canada proposed in the United Nations Security Council that, in order to eliminate the fears which were felt on both sides, there be established an international inspection of the Arctic area. That would make it less possible for anyone to mount a sudden massive surprise attack through the new and short routes over the top of the world. This proposal was supported in the Security Council by every member except the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union vetoed our proposal.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Union can scarcely blame us if we conclude that it has aggressive dispositions in this area which it desires to conceal. That is an unhappy conclusion, but it is one that Soviet conduct compels us to accept. But our peaceful preference is clear. Whenever the Soviet Union wants to know what are our Arctic dispositions, so that it cannot be taken by surprise or act on what might be miscalculations, it can have that knowledge, provided only it is willing to reciprocate. In the meantime we have no choice but to continue to cooperate to build deterrent and defensive forces. Our northern frontiers need to be manned and defended by closely interlocking efforts. I am happy to say that such a system is in fact in efficient operation.

#### **The Sharing of Beliefs**

I have given you reasons of strategy, based on geography, as to why Canada and the United States need to act together. We are, however, bound together by considerations much more basic than those I have so far mentioned. We are not only nations of the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Arctic. We are nations of the free, animated by a similar faith.

Our peoples predominantly believe that each individual human being has his origin and destiny in God and thus has a spiritual nature and personal dignity.

We believe that all men are endowed by their Creator with rights to think, to believe, and to choose, and that men cannot be justly deprived of these rights by any government or group of men, however powerful.

We believe that all men should have equal opportunity.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *BULLETIN* of May 12, 1958, p. 760, and May 19, 1958, p. 816.

We believe that just government rests upon the consent of the governed.

We believe that the basic guides to human action derive not from the arbitrary fiat of government but from the love of fellow man, the self-controls and self-restraint which are enjoined by moral law.

As against such beliefs stands the atheistic, materialistic creed of international communism. According to that creed, human beings are merely animated particles of matter; they need to be brought into order and harmony, of deed and thought, by being subjected to a dictatorship that will compel them to conform to a master plan of universal scope. Only thus, it is taught, can there be total harmony, maximum productivity, and world peace.

Relatively few people are genuine adherents of international communism. But these are fanatical, and they aggressively promote their creed at all times, in all places, and by all means. Force, fraud, and propaganda are invoked whenever it seems that it will serve their purposes. Already by such means they have subjected the governments of all or major parts of 16 nations to their direction. Thus they impose their will upon one-third of all the people of the earth. Their propaganda and their subversive apparatus operate in every one of the still free countries.

This menace can be successfully countered only as those who believe as we believe see to it that their faith, in unison, becomes a dynamic force. We must resist at all times and at all places the challenge of communism and not only resist but manifest our own faith by works so creative and so beneficent that their influence is a positive force, felt throughout all the world, including those areas now dominated by international communism.

The peoples of Canada and of the United States cherish the same ideals and faith in democratic ways. We work closely together, with other of the more developed free-world nations, to assist countries which are less developed.

One important means of organizing and channeling our efforts in Asia is the so-called Colombo Plan. Both Canada and the United States actively participate in the plan. In a few days we shall both be attending its annual meeting, to be held this year at Seattle.

In such ways we show that our faith is not merely something that we try to defend, but that it is a dynamic force, showing its good fruits throughout all the world.

### **A Basic Harmony**

I have pointed to a few of the many compulsions to common action that flow from our peoples' sense of common danger, of common purpose, and of common destiny.

Of course, as between our nations there are differences. That is nothing that should surprise us. There are differences within every social group and social sphere. Such differences are the inevitable consequences of the diversities, the competitions, which enrich every free society. Only communism teaches that diversity is inherently evil and that, to eradicate diversity, worldwide conformity must be imposed.

But if our two nations have their differences, let us not aggravate them or exaggerate them. They are insignificant in comparison with what unites us. We can therefore—indeed, we must—go forward together in basic harmony, as sovereign equals, settling our differences in a spirit of understanding and conciliation and standing together, as members of the goodly company of the free, in singleness of purpose to defend our common vital interests and to assure that our ideals shall prevail in all the world.

### **Letters of Credence**

#### *Nepal*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Nepal, Rishikesh Shah, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on October 27. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 645.

#### *Yugoslavia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Marko Nikezic, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on October 27. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 644.

## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 28

Press release 648 dated October 28

*Secretary Dulles:* I have a statement to read. Mimeographed copies will be available as you leave.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet insincerity in relation to the testing of nuclear weapons has now been clearly exposed. For years the Soviet Union has been carrying on an intensive propaganda designed to persuade the world that it was in this matter motivated by high humanitarian purposes. Now the Soviet Government has been brought from the realm of words to the realm of deeds by the United States-United Kingdom offer to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons for at least 1 year, beginning October 31.<sup>2</sup> At this point the Soviet Union reverses itself and rejects our offer.

Despite its professed concern for the effect of testing upon human health, the Soviet Government has been testing at an intensive rate. Since September 30 it has made at least 14 test explosions. Some 7 of these were of high yield, in the megaton range. It now announces that it plans to go on testing after October 31. This demonstrates the hollowness of these past Soviet expressions of concern.

There is still time for the Soviet Union to reconsider its position. The United States for its part stands by its offer to withhold further testing of nuclear weapons when the Geneva negotiations begin on October 31, unless evidence is received that the Soviet Union has actually conducted a nuclear weapons test after that date.

The United States delegation is now on its way to the Geneva talks.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet attitude dims the chances of success. But we shall persevere in the effort to make a beginning in the work of disarmament.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what happens if word is received that the Soviets have exploded an atomic*

<sup>1</sup> The following four paragraphs were also released separately as press release 647 dated Oct. 28.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by President Eisenhower, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

<sup>3</sup> For an announcement, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1958, p. 724.

*device after October 31st? What effect will that have on United States policy or United States action?*

A. Well, we would ourselves make plans to resume testing. But the negotiations, so far as we are concerned, would go on.

### Evolution of Soviet System

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the account of the British television interview you gave,<sup>4</sup> which I read, you were quoted as thinking that the Communists in the future would spend more time on the welfare of their people perhaps than on international revolution. This seems to be something of a departure from the remarks you made quite consistently here and your considered inference about the international conspiracy of the Communists and their international ambitions. Could you develop that a little bit more for us—what you had in mind?*

A. Yes, I would be glad to do so. That is not the first time I have expressed this view. I have expressed it many times to the effect that the long-range prospect—indeed, I would say the long-range certainty—is that there will be an evolution of the present policies of the Soviet rulers so that they will become more nationalist and less internationalist. At the present time they are the slaves, so to speak, of the doctrine of international communism, world revolution, and the importance of using every available asset, human and material, to spread its rule throughout the world. That means that the people that they already have hold of are exploited in order to get hold of more, and that their primary consideration is not the welfare of the presently ruled people but the opportunity to exploit them, to extract from them, in order to extend Communist rule in the world.

I do not believe that system can go on indefinitely. I believe it is inevitable that there will be

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 733.

an evolution, a change, toward a government which is more concerned with the welfare of its own people and less concerned with exploiting those people in order to gain further conquests abroad. That evolution is, to some slight extent, already taking place. There is perhaps more concern today in the Soviet Union than there was under Stalin's time with the welfare of the people. There is more personal security, a little more freedom of thought, and I think some more attention being paid to the welfare of the people. I think that, in its broad movement, is an irreversible trend.

Now I notice that the indications are that their current, or next, 7-year plan will keep emphasis very much on heavy industries, and it looks as though the evolutionary trend had been slowed for the time being. But I think in the long run it is sure to move in that direction.

*Q. Just one more question. Don't you think this meaning seems to contradict somewhat your previous theories that communism would collapse of its own weight?*

A. No, that is precisely the way it is going to collapse. It is going to collapse through the fact that in the long run people are not going to allow themselves to be exploited, to be squeezed, merely to gain external conquests. The Government is going to have to adjust itself more to meet the demands of its own people.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you notice or anticipate any such evolution in Communist China as well?*

A. Certainly.

*Q. Sir, are you speaking in terms of decades or centuries?*

A. I would find great difficulty in putting a time schedule, but I would say that it is more likely in terms of decades than in terms of centuries. I would say it is absolutely certain in terms of centuries. It is probable in terms of decades.

#### **Chinese Communists' Cease-Fire Policy**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the idea of having war every other day? (Laughter)*

A. Well, it is part of this upside-down acting and talking to which we have had to grow accustomed, or try to grow accustomed. It seems to me the most shocking aspect of it is the complete

demonstration that this shooting is not for military purposes but merely for the purpose of promiscuous killing. If you have a military purpose, you carry on your shooting for military objectives and your purpose is to destroy the capacity of your enemy to resist. When you do it only every other day and say, in between times you can bring in supplies—indeed, we will give them to you, so as to increase your capacity to resist—and the next day you do your shooting, that shows the killing is done for political purposes and promiscuously. It is only designed to kill primarily the civilians, who are the ones most exposed. It is an extremely repugnant procedure according to our standards.

*Q. Do you recall any precedent for any cease-fire arrangement such as this?*

A. No, I think it has no precedent. I think it can be explained. My own interpretation of it is this: For 7 weeks they carried on a very intensive bombardment, together with interference by naval craft, to try to interdict the resupplying of the islands. At the end of that 7 weeks it became apparent that the techniques that had been developed jointly between the Chinese Nationalists and ourselves, and carried out primarily by the Chinese, were such that the island could not be cut off and made to wither on the vine, so to speak, through this level of fire. Therefore they had to confront a new situation. They knew that we could resupply the island; so in order to save face they said, "We will let you resupply the island every other day." Thus what we had demonstrated, the ability to do so against their will, they now made to appear as something that we did at their will. In that way they are trying to save themselves from a loss of face and a defeat in the effort which they had initiated but had been unable to conclude successfully.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you suggest, then, that they will allow the firing to just wither away one of these days and be done with it?*

A. That is a possibility. I wouldn't ever bank heavily, put all your bets, on just one theory of the Chinese Communists' action, because they can reverse themselves overnight. But it seems as though, at least for the moment, they do not want to raise up the level of their military effort, as by bringing in large amounts of airpower and the like; also they did not want to be exposed as hav-

ing failed in the present level of effort. So, as I say, to save their face they seemed to devise this somewhat outlandish and rather uncivilized way of dealing with it. What they will do in the future I don't know. My belief is that they will not engage in a level of military effort which is likely to provoke a general war. I do not think they want that, and I think they know that that would not be a profitable enterprise for them to engage in.

Furthermore it has been made apparent beyond any possibility of doubt that their real objective in this affair is not Quemoy and Matsu but is Taiwan itself. They are now concentrating for a time, at least, how long I don't know, on propaganda efforts which are designed to try to split the inhabitants of Taiwan away from cooperation with the Americans. In effect they say, "Let's have a coprosperity sphere of Asia for the Asians. Let us work together and get rid of these Americans—they are the cause of all our trouble." They now seem to be concentrating on propaganda aspects of the matter.

#### Renunciation of Force

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in respect to the so-called renunciation of force in the communique<sup>5</sup> of Taiwan last week the Chinese American Ambassador, George Yeh, said that that renunciation is not unconditional. Aside from the obvious reservation in respect to self-defense, can you explain or clarify under what other conditions it might not be unconditional?*

A. As I read the report of Ambassador Yeh's statement, he primarily clarified the point that the renunciation of force was, of course, not applicable to defense. I think no one makes a renunciation of force which excludes the use of force for defensive purposes. Certainly we do not nor have we ever asked anybody else to do that. Now the importance of this statement that was made by the Nationalist Government—President Chiang Kai-shek and the other high officials there—was that it involved a fresh formulation of the mission of the Government of Free China. It was important in putting the emphasis upon winning through peaceful processes rather than through attempts to win by force.

Now you can say, if you wish, that they didn't

have much chance of winning by force, in any case; therefore it is meaningless. That would not be a fair appraisal of what took place. It is highly significant that there was this fresh public formulation. It is going to bring with it a shift of emphasis, in my opinion, and put their mission on a long-range basis which is going to be full of significance for the future. Now we didn't attempt to make a technical agreement, or a criminal statute, where you parse every word in it. It did involve a very significant reformulation of their mission in terms of its peaceful purposes and not in terms of force.

I wouldn't want to go into a discussion of every possible future hypothesis and say whether or not the use of force was totally excluded. I think to attempt that would be to miss the point of what took place. There has been a very important reformulation of mission and that is the significant aspect of the declaration.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a few days ago Russia announced a loan of 400 million rubles to the United Arab Republic to help build the first stages of the Aswan Dam. This offer by the Soviets has been interpreted in some quarters in that area as a propaganda defeat for the United States. Could you comment on the Soviet action, and also could you tell us how you assess it?*

A. The fact that the Soviet Union did something along this line is no surprise; indeed, the only surprising thing is that it has not happened earlier. As a matter of fact, I thought they would be doing something of this sort back in '56—2 years ago. The significance of it in practical terms cannot be accurately appraised at the present time. One talks about 400 million rubles, but rubles, as you know, have a highly problematic value. They have a theoretical value of four to the dollar. You can buy rubles in Switzerland for a few cents apiece. The question of what it really amounts to can only be answered when you see, in fact, how they price what they give. I don't think it is anything to get terribly excited about. It is something of which they are attempting to get a considerable propaganda value at the present time. What it will amount to economically in terms of actually building the dam is something only the future can tell.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection there are also reports that perhaps as part of this, or concur-*

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 721.

rently, the United Arab Republic has concluded a new deal for Communist arms. Do we have any information on that point?

A. We have no hard information on that point. The information we have is speculative, and I wouldn't feel in a position either to confirm or deny it today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, back in the 1957 London talks on disarmament the Soviet Union proposed that a trial suspension be held for 2 or 3 years. Now they have raised the ante to forever. Could it be that they are angling to go back and would be willing to compromise on the 2- or 3-year suspension?*

A. Our proposal in effect involves really a 2-year suspension, assuming that the negotiations that are conducted beginning October 31 proceed. If those come to a conclusion and we agree upon a system of controls, and so forth, then there is another year during which those are to be installed, and the extension would continue for that time; and then they would continue on still further from then, of course, if progress is made in other aspects of disarmament.

I don't know what is in the Soviet mind in this respect. There is speculation, which is entitled to some credibility, to the effect that the talks of the experts at Geneva on the control matters opened the eyes of the Soviet Union to the fact that our own knowledge was considerably greater than theirs about nuclear weapons and the uses of nuclear power for weapon purposes; that they realized that they were considerably behind in this matter, and therefore they lost interest in the suspension, so that their primary purpose now is to extricate themselves from the suspension of testing without excessive damage to their propaganda position. I would think that that is perhaps more likely than that they are maneuvering for a 2-year suspension.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, getting a little closer to home, what is your forecast of the election results? (Laughter)*

A. Well, that is too close to home. I am engaged in discussion of foreign affairs.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in a recent speech in Boston<sup>\*</sup> you again emphasized the desirability of a closer liaison among the various free-world organiza-*

*tions, including the Organization of American States. Insofar as your original proposal in this direction at Paris brought a mixed reaction from Latin America—I believe Brazil and Peru were very much in favor and Mexico was slightly reluctant—can you tell us whether you plan to pursue this point now, or just what are your plans to achieve this closer liaison?*

A. The initiative in this matter of course at the present time rests primarily with Mr. [Paul-Henri] Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO. He has a mandate from the members of the North Atlantic Treaty to develop these contacts, and he is carrying them forward with the Baghdad Pact, with the SEATO, and also with the Organization of American States. I think from the standpoint of the security arrangements the progress made in relation to the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO is more significant than the contacts with the Organization of American States. The OAS is not primarily an organization for security purposes but is even more an organization of a community to develop its own resources, its own political relations, to settle its own disputes. I believe that there is more to be learned by NATO from the OAS in those terms than in the security terms. I have no doubt that that aspect of the relationship will develop to be mutually advantageous. But it will not, I think, concern itself primarily with security problems.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any understanding with Chiang and the other Free Chinese leaders that this reformulation will permit the reduction of manpower on Matsu and Quemoy?*

A. We have no understanding in that respect. There has been no deal or anything of that sort or any agreement. Naturally under conditions of warfare those things are rather difficult to work out. There has been and will be a constant study of how the military resources of the Republic of China can be used to the greatest advantage. That is being conducted entirely at a military level. Under present conditions at least it will be purely a military judgment.

*Q. Will there be any increase in economic aid to Taiwan itself?*

A. That was not discussed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last night the President announced that the Red Chinese had announced*

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., Oct. 13, 1958, p. 571.

that they had withdrawn their forces from north Korea. Is that a significant milestone?

*Q. We couldn't hear the question.*

A. The question was as to whether or not the Chinese Communists' announcement of withdrawal of forces from north Korea had signifi-

### **Soviet Inconsistencies on Test Suspension**

#### *Department Statement*

Press release 655 dated October 30

The Soviet public statement issued today about suspension of nuclear testing embodies curious inconsistencies. It says that the United States and the United Kingdom, by proposing an initial suspension of testing for at least 1 year, beginning October 31, are seeking to obtain a one-sided military advantage over the Soviet Union. This, the Soviet statement says, cannot be accepted because of concern for the security of the Soviet people. But at the same time the statement describes as absurd the idea that the Western powers have any superiority in the field of nuclear research.

In the Twelfth General Assembly of the United Nations (September 20, 1957) the Soviet Government proposed that the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons "shall be discontinued for a period of two or three years as from June 1, 1958." But now that the United States and the United Kingdom have moved toward acceptance of this Soviet position by proposing an initial suspension of 1 year subject to prolongation, the Soviet Government says that it is only interested in a discontinuation of such testing "for all time."

cance. I would say that it has very little significance because our impression is that the withdrawal would only be a withdrawal to the other side of the Yalu River so that there could very rapidly be a redeployment back again into Korea.<sup>7</sup> The United Nations forces, of which the United States forms a part, are in Korea on a mission which has not yet been completed, that is to bring about the reunification of Korea under free elections. I would not think that the present circumstances were propitious for anything like a total withdrawal of our forces, which if it occurred would be a withdrawal not for 50 miles but a distance of 10,000 miles.

<sup>7</sup> See also p. 781.

### **Prospects for Agreement on Nuclear Test Ban**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, putting together a couple of answers to questions earlier, I gather your view of the Geneva talks is that there is not very much prospect of agreement on a nuclear test ban at this time because the Russians feel they are behind the United States and they can't afford to stop testing. Is that right?*

A. I said that that was one theory which was entitled to some credibility. It's speculative. But certainly the Russians have acted, particularly in the last 30 days or since the conclusion of the experts' talks, in a manner which is a considerable reversal of the way they acted and the way they talked prior to that time. While this action dims the prospect of success, as I said, one should never be confident of his ability to read the minds of the Communists in respect to matters like this.

You may recall that, at the time when we thought there had been agreement about the meeting of the experts, all of a sudden the Soviets apparently called it off and said they would not give any passports to allow their experts to go to Geneva. There was a period there of 48 hours where it looked as though that whole conference had been blown up. But we persisted, and we said, "Well, your experts may not go to Geneva but ours are going"; and we put them on the plane and we sent them on their way. And after 48 hours the Soviets again reversed their position. So, from our standpoint at least, they are unpredictable. They may have their own rationale about all this business, but it's pretty difficult for us to read their minds.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think this also dims the chances of success of the meeting which was scheduled to begin in Geneva November 10th on methods to prevent surprise attack?*

A. It's hard to be optimistic about these matters. The only ground for optimism is the fact that, whereas until recently the Soviets would not get down to any technical discussion of these matters at all, at least they have gotten down to a technical discussion of the suspension matter and apparently are willing to get down to a technical discussion of the creation of areas of protection against sudden surprise attack.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648, and Nov. 3, 1958, p. 688.

Now that does mark a little progress. It's only a little. And, as I have indicated before, the Soviets are very tough when it comes to negotiating. They are apt to make it appear at the beginning as though there was very little chance. They try to soften up their opponents in an effort to make them more willing to accept what are desirable terms from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. This may be all part of a technique. But I would say that in these forthcoming talks, both in relation to the suspension of testing and protection against surprise attack, we are animated more by hope than by expectation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify one remark you made earlier, you said that we would continue to plan tests if the Russians did not suspend their tests on October 31st or thereafter, I think. Does that mean that, if they don't have any tests after October 31st, we will not then plan for any future tests?*

A. We will not plan for future tests during the period that we proposed, the 1-year period.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President and the Vice President in the last 2 weeks particularly have repeatedly emphasized that, if Democratic radicals get further control of Congress, the Nation is in for a siege of reckless spending. What are your fears, if any, of the so-called radical control of Congress in relation to foreign policy?*

A. Let me say that the air is already thick with politics. I'm not going to add to that atmosphere.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Aswan Dam again, sir, under the new circumstances there, has the United States received any hint from Cairo that the Egyptians would like to have a resumption of foreign aid from us for the dam, and can you foresee any circumstances under which you would wish to give such?*

A. You will recall that President Eisenhower, at the extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the Middle East, indicated our willingness to participate in a regional development organization if that were desired by the Arab countries.<sup>9</sup> That concept is being explored actively by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Of course, if anything came of that, such an organization would be

available to help on projects of this sort. But it would be too early, I think, to say now whether the Arab countries will want that or not. Of course the Soviet Union has recently indicated that it is not very much interested in dealing with these matters on a multilateral basis and prefers to deal with them on a direct bilateral basis, presumably because it can get more political advantages if it deals in that way.

But the scheme of a regional development fund for the Middle East is one which we accept in principle and which other free-world countries agree to. If that should go ahead, it would provide resources which presumably could be used for this purpose.

## **International Joint Commission Holds Executive Meetings**

*Following is a joint release issued at Ottawa and Washington at the close of the semiannual executive meetings of the International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada), which were held at Ottawa October 14-17.*

Press release 632 dated October 21

OTTAWA, October 17

The International Joint Commission today completed the semi-annual executive meetings which began here last Tuesday under the chairmanship of General A. G. L. McNaughton.

The Commission, which was created under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to deal with problems involving use and obstruction of waters which flow along or across the United States-Canadian boundary, consists of three members from the United States and three from Canada. Present members are The Honorable Douglas McKay, Eugene W. Weber and Francis L. Adams for the United States and General A. G. L. McNaughton, J. Lucien Dansereau and Donald M. Stephens for Canada. Mr. Adams was appointed to the Commission recently to succeed R. B. McWhorter, who has retired from active federal service.

The International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers filed with the Commission a report on the effects on Lake Ontario water levels of Gut Dam and channel changes in Galop Rapids Reach of the St. Lawrence River. The Gut Dam was re-

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.

moved by Canada in 1952 following the Commission's approval of the St. Lawrence River Power Project. The Board indicated that its final report under the Lake Ontario levels reference will be filed with the Commission in the very near future.

The Commission decided to enlarge the membership of its International St. Lawrence River Board of Control in order to provide that interests on navigation in Canada will be represented directly on the Board, rather than at the committee level as heretofore.

The Commission decided to advise the governments of Canada and the United States regarding the recommended method of regulating the levels and flows in the St. Lawrence River and the water levels in Lake Ontario, and to request the two governments to arrange for this regulation to be put into effect in accordance with the terms of orders of approval issued by the Commission.

The Commission gave further consideration to a report of the International St. Croix River Engineering Board, in the light of submissions made at the public hearing which the Commission held in Calais, Maine, last June. Arrangements were made for the completion of the report which the Commission was requested by the reference of June 10, 1955 to make to the governments of Canada and the United States.

The Counsel for the City of Seattle, Washington, and for the Province of British Columbia appeared before the Commission and made representations regarding the raising of the water levels in Ross Reservoir on Skagit River. From these representations it was apparent that the difference of opinion existed as to the interpretation of the order of approval which the Commission issued in 1942 for Seattle to flood lands above the boundary in British Columbia, provided binding agreement was first entered into with the Government of British Columbia. Counsel for the governments of the United States and Canada were also heard. It was decided that the opportunity would be afforded counsel for various interests to file written briefs to assist the Commission in its further consideration of the matter.

The Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board reported satisfactory progress in its preliminary investigation of the proposals by which the waters from the proposed Garrison Diversion Project in the Missouri River Basin could be used jointly by interests on the Souris and Pembina Rivers in North Dakota and Manitoba.

The Technical Advisory Board on Air Pollution filed its final report to the Commission on Air Pollution in the Detroit River area. The report will be printed and made available to interested parties as soon as possible, following which public hearings will be held in the area.

The Advisory Boards on Control of Pollution of Boundary Waters reported continuing progress by municipalities and industries situated on the connecting channels of the Great Lakes towards eliminating pollution of these boundary waters.

The International Columbia River Engineering Board advised that its main report to the Commission will be printed and filed with the Commission by March 1, 1959. Several appendices to the report will be available by September 1959. The Commission will meet with the Board at Chicago on March 16, 1959 to review the report, following which it is anticipated that the report will be made available to interested parties as a basis of public hearings which it is planned to hold in the Columbia River Basin next summer.

The International Passamaquoddy Fisheries Board reported that its study of the effects of the proposed Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project on fisheries in the area is proceeding on schedule and that the final report will be available next year as required in the reference from the two governments. The Passamaquoddy Engineering Board presented its progress report, including the outline of the principal problems which have developed in the survey so far. These were resolved, to permit completion of the survey during the next year.

## **U.S. and Paraguay Sign DLF Loan**

*Press release 650 dated October 29*

The United States and Paraguay on October 29 signed a loan agreement making \$2.5 million in development loan funds available for completion of an all-weather, rock-surface road in Paraguay known as the Route to Brazil. The funds will be used primarily for financing crushed-rock surfacing of the section between Coronel Oviedo and Puerto Presidente Stroessner.

The agreement was signed by Ambassador Juan Plate for the Government of Paraguay and Robert B. Menapace, Acting Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund, for the United States.

## The Arab Refugees: A Decade of Dilemma for the United Nations

by James M. Ludlow

*United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Ten years ago a problem was created for the members of the United Nations which today remains unsolved and yet remains a continuing challenge today and for the days ahead. That problem is the fate and future of the Arab refugees.

During the past 10 years the United States has borne by far the heaviest responsibility for pressing for a solution of this staggering humanitarian problem. Through persistent, yet patient, quiet negotiation; through leadership in debate in the United Nations General Assembly; through the contribution of consecrated manpower; and through the contribution of over \$200 million, the United States has sought to insure the welfare of these homeless, unhappy individuals who today total nearly a million charges of the United Nations.

In the light of what I have just said, as friends of the United Nations and as American taxpayers you are entitled to ask a few questions. How did the Arab refugee problem get started in the first place? What has been and is now being done for the refugees? And what of their future?

### Origin of Arab Refugee Problem

Answering these questions in order, we should first recall that this time 10 years ago, in what had been the Palestine Mandate area, there was savage fighting between the armed forces of the newly created State of Israel and the armed forces of the Arab states surrounding Israel. The fighting between these forces stemmed from an

effort of the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 to resolve what had already become a critical problem between the Jewish and Arab residents of the Palestine Mandate. The General Assembly had sought by resolution to partition the mandate area into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with an economic union between them and with a separate international status for the city and environs of Jerusalem. From the moment of the adoption of the resolution the Arab states had made clear their resistance to the implementation of the resolution. The proponents of the State of Israel were as determined to insure the establishment of that state as the Arabs were opposed to it.

In the early months of 1948 frantic efforts were made by the United States and other friends of the peoples of the area to insure a peaceful settlement of an already worsening crisis. However, the British Government, which had been the mandate power, surrendered the mandate, as it had said it would, on May 15, 1948. On that date Israel declared itself a state. The Arab states, under the aegis of the then King of Egypt, started marching troops into the Palestine area against the Israelis. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized Israel immediately.

Because of the fighting, which grew rapidly in intensity, hundreds of thousands of Arabs who were living in the area which Israel now proclaimed as its state fled or were driven from their homes into the surrounding Arab states, which have become the host governments for them.

By September 1948 the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, reported to the United Nations Security Council that a serious refugee problem existed; that the estimated num-

<sup>1</sup> Address made at a United Nations Day luncheon at Bay City, Mich., on Oct. 24, 1958.

ber of refugees was over a half million; and that, because of their uncertain status and plight, the United Nations should affirm the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes at the earliest possible date or, alternatively, be compensated for their property which Israel had taken over.

Pursuant to this recommendation, and in the belief that the problem was readily remediable, the General Assembly on December 11, 1948, resolved

... that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

This provision actually was part of a resolution which was designed to achieve an overall solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. Thus the resolution set up a Palestine Conciliation Commission to negotiate a settlement between the factions. The United States, consistent with its already clear policy of seeking the earliest practicable settlement of the refugee problem, voted for the resolution. The Soviet bloc and the Arab states voted solidly against it.

Just prior to the adoption of this resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in the interests of urgent assistance to the Palestine refugees, to set up a special fund into which contributions should be made by the members and nonmembers of the United Nations. A relief program was set up under a director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) on December 1, 1948. The then Ambassador of the United States to Egypt, Stanton Griffis, was named director. The functions of UNRPR were limited to short-term relief which would end in August 1949. When no resolution of the refugee relief problem was apparent by that time, UNRPR's operations were extended through the General Assembly which met in the fall of 1949.

#### **U.N. Relief and Works Agency**

On December 8, 1949, the General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to carry out relief and works projects in collaboration with the local governments.

UNRWA formally succeeded UNRPR on May 1, 1950, and is today the agency charged with the care of the Palestine refugees.

As had been the case with UNRPR, it had been envisaged that the need for relief would cease by the close of 1950. However, by the commencement of the regular session of the General Assembly in 1950, it was apparent that the relief problem continued to exist and that the works projects, which consisted largely of such activities as road-building, small construction projects, and afforestation, could not successfully meet the long-range needs of the refugees. Therefore, by General Assembly action in 1950, a rehabilitation program was set up with emphasis on large-scale planning for rehabilitation and resettlement rather than on projects involving temporary employment. The operational life of UNRWA was extended to the end of June 1952. It is noteworthy that this resolution was adopted unanimously, with only the Soviet bloc abstaining.

In January 1952 the agency's life was extended to June 30, 1954. This mandate was subsequently extended to the presently indicated terminal date of June 30, 1960.

#### **What Is Being Done for the Refugees?**

Turning to our second question, namely, "What has been done and is being done for the refugees?", we find that, on the one hand, financial contributions for the relief and rehabilitation of the refugees have been increasingly difficult to obtain. On the other hand, with such contributions as UNRWA has received, it has done one of the most extraordinarily efficient and thorough jobs in behalf of the Arab refugees that any agency could hope to carry out. While the contributions for the past year were adequate for relief, for the past 2 years the rehabilitation programs have had to be drastically reduced and now consist of the barest minimum of education and vocational training.

As for the relief program, the agency is confronted each year with more mouths to feed since the excess of births over the total of deaths and the number of rehabilitated refugees remain high. The agency is able to feed and care for the individual refugees at an average cost of approximately 7½ cents per person per day, or \$27 per year. The basic daily ration consists of 1,600 calories in the wintertime and 1,500 calories in the sum-

mer. Special rations, in addition to the basic rations, are issued to nonhospitalized tuberculosis patients, to babies, to children 1 to 15 years old, to pregnant women, to nursing mothers, and to sick persons on medical recommendations. For example, 700 calories in a hot midday meal, 6 days weekly, are issued to sick refugees (mainly children) on medical recommendation.

Of the total number of registered refugees, there are in Jordan approximately 545,000; in Lebanon, 109,000; in Gaza, 230,000; and in the Syrian part of the United Arab Republic, 100,000—a total of 984,000 registered refugees. About 40 percent of the refugees are provided shelter as well as social services. Over the years the shelter program has steadily improved, interestingly enough, to the point where in some localities the camps constitute—relatively speaking—some of the best housing in the vicinity. The medical program operates with such efficiency that the general health of the refugees remains substantially above the general health of nonrefugees in the neighborhood. Twenty-five of the UNRWA camps are in Jordan, where the refugees represent over one-third of the population of the country.

#### **Rehabilitation Programs Curtailed**

While the agency can rightly point with pride to its relief program, and while it is essential, the program *per se* is no solution for the refugee problem. The important thing clearly is that the refugee may, with dignity, find for himself work and possibly a new home which will take him off relief.

The education program, particularly the vocational-training program, is a pathetically small but nevertheless effective means of achieving this desired end. There is generally an ever-ready demand for skilled and semiskilled workers such as the vocational-training programs are able to produce. In an effort to meet this need, beside the vocational-training program, UNRWA has in the past helped finance the preparation of detailed engineering studies for the construction of resettlement projects in the Jordan Valley in the northwest part of the Sinai Peninsula. It has also financed smaller studies of other settlement possibilities in Syria and Jordan, such as well drilling on the west bank of the Jordan Valley. Unfortunately, however, because of the failure of members of the United Nations—other than the United States, the United Kingdom, and a few others—

to make contributions to the rehabilitation programs, these programs have had to be drastically curtailed. Thus the individual-grants program in Jordan and small-scale livestock projects and urban housing, also in Jordan, have been discontinued.

The termination of the individual-grants program was truly unfortunate. One of the most encouraging developments had been the fact that there were several thousand applications for such small grants, generally amounting to about \$400 per approved application. With such assistance the individual Arab refugee had almost invariably with extraordinary ingenuity and determination, made for himself some small business pursuit adequate to care for not only himself and his family but in some instances other refugees as employees. This sort of private initiative is something which we always extoll here in this country, but now unfortunately, because of the shortage of funds, it has had to be discontinued.

As I have already said, however, these programs of self-help were by no means, and never could be, the solution to the ultimate rehabilitation of enough refugees to liquidate the problem. Nor, for that matter, could any of the larger projects, but they at least, had they been taken off of the drawing boards and the negotiating table and put into operation, would have given a promising future, not only for an impressive percentage of the refugees themselves but for the countries wherein the projects would be built.

#### **The Jordan River Project**

I cannot help but speak with deep personal feeling of regret every time I think of these major projects because it was my privilege to work with Eric Johnston on his earnest and painstaking efforts to achieve agreement among the Arab states, on the one hand, and with Israel, on the other, for the development and full utilization of the waters of the Jordan River system. Had the program been accepted by the affected states, the gross national product of the individual states would have soared, particularly Jordan's. Not only were substantial areas of barren land to be put into effective cultivation, but hydroelectric power was to have been developed. Arising from these basic elements of the program, there would have come new trades and activities, like transportation, communication, marketing, and manufacturing. In

Jordan alone, for example, we estimated that the gross national product would have multiplied 5 or 6 times from these developments. Unfortunately the program was not accepted. Unfortunately refugees remain in camps and on relief and have yet to find some self-respecting way of facing the future.

Having spoken of what the agency has done and is doing for the refugees, it is valid for us next to inquire, "What have the United States and other members of the United Nations done, and what are they doing now?"

#### **The Role of the United States**

I alluded at the outset of my comments to the initiative and role of the United States. Let me here, therefore, but briefly reemphasize this role. Since the commencement of programs designed to care for these refugees, the United States has loyally supported every single resolution on the problem in the United Nations. It sponsored most of the resolutions, together with a few other particularly interested governments. The United States has consistently contributed key personnel to insure the effective functioning of the agency. These dedicated people have done much to insure that the agency accomplished its assigned functions with good will and efficiency.

But, beyond the mere functioning of the agency, the Government has persisted in looking to and working for the ultimate solution of the refugee problem. Over the past 10 years the United States, as a member of the United Nations, has patiently pressed the parties directly concerned to take a variety of steps which might lead to the earliest solution of this problem. As a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was charged with negotiating a settlement, the United States has played an active and continuing role in attempting to arrange bases for such settlement between the parties.

In 1950 we took the lead in urging that the Commission look ahead to the practical problems which would be inherent in the compensation of refugees. As a result of this initiative the Commission was charged with planning for the compensation of refugees who might not choose to return to their homes. This planning involved the laborious task of identifying the properties in the former Palestine Mandate area so that claimants for compensation could have their

claims validated and handled expeditiously. This work also involved not only the identification of properties but an attempt to establish an estimate as to a total value of the property left by the refugees. The work of this group of experts of the Commission has been slow, but the identification process is now virtually completed. Estimates are now being made as to the total cost of compensation.

In 1951 the United States took the lead in calling a conference of the Arab states and Israel, under the aegis of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, designed to consider the possibilities of overall settlement, including repatriation or compensation. The conference failed because neither side was really prepared to move much from its already increasingly rigid political position.

In 1953, at the request of UNRWA, the Tennessee Valley Authority undertook a brilliant and painstaking engineering plan for the development of the Jordan River system. This plan, when completed, served as the basis for the United States again taking the initiative, through Eric Johnston, in seeking to negotiate an overall agreement for the development and full utilization of that vital river system.

In 1954 the United States agreed to the extension of UNRWA's mandate only because of its hopes for such projects as the Jordan River Valley plan.

In 1955 Secretary of State Dulles laid out for our friends in the Middle East, in a speech in August of that year,<sup>2</sup> the outlines of what could be the start of a general settlement of the refugee problem and the remaining political differences between Israel and the Arab states.

The United States has, as already indicated, through the past 10 years contributed over \$200 million to the relief and rehabilitation programs of the agency. This amount has constituted two-thirds of the total amount which has been expended on behalf of the refugees in the past decade.

What of the other members of the United Nations?

Our British and Canadian friends stand next to us in terms of contributions and in terms of interest and political support in and out of the United Nations to achieve the settlement of this problem. This is not to slight the lesser contribu-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

tions which have been received steadily from other conscientious members of the United Nations. But, regrettably, it must be pointed out that only approximately a third of the members of the United Nations have contributed to the work of UNRWA.

I cannot conclude these comments without a word or two about the contributions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. These contributions can be best summed up as copious words deliberately designed to insure that hatreds and misunderstandings remain ever alive but not one red ruble—not one—for the continued support of the agency or the welfare of the refugees. If one needs a demonstration of the callous unconcern of the professed “protectors” of the downtrodden and the unfortunate, here is an example.

#### **What Is the Future for the Refugees?**

Clearly, our third question is our most important question, namely: “What is the future for the refugees?”

In order to understand the future, we must again look to the past. Had there been good will and mutual understanding any time during the past 10 years between Israel and the Arab states as to what the future of the Arab refugees was to be, the problem would have been solved or well on the way to solution by now. Unfortunately these preconditions to the solution have not existed, and—we might as well face it—they do not exist today. While the United States and some other members of the United Nations have sought the earliest settlement of what should have been considered a humanitarian problem, Israel and the Arab host governments have made the Arab refugee problem a political problem. While there have been from time to time private indications on both sides of a willingness to take steps toward settling the problem, publicly the Arab host governments, citing the repatriation-compensation provisions of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, contend that solution of the problem lies solely in the implementation of those provisions. Israel rejects the repatriation of the refugees, contending that the refugees would be better off among their Arab brethren and that it would be willing to consider the matter of compensation to these refugees, assuming the availability of funds.

Behind the rigidity of their respective posi-

tions there lies a certain degree of justice on both sides. The Arab governments, which, as I pointed out at the outset of this speech, unanimously rejected the December 1948 resolution, now claim for the refugees the right of option. However, they have so heavily stressed this to the refugees that the refugees have come quite justifiably to feel that anything other than the exercise of that option would be a denial of justice. If one appreciates the importance which justice *per se* represents to our individual Arab friends, one can come to appreciate that they can and will suffer much to obtain what they consider to be justice.

The question logically arises, of course, as to what the refugees would do if they had the chance to exercise the option which they have come to feel is their inalienable right. It is, of course, hard to estimate how many refugees might, given the option, decide to return to what is now the State of Israel. Many of the older refugees have over the past 10 years continued to live in the dream that they could return and find their homes just as they left them. In another year or two, virtually half of the refugees now cared for by UNRWA will be 15 years of age or younger, which means that a good portion of them will have, at best, only a few fleeting memories of their former homes. Many refugees, if they chose repatriation, would expect to do so only for the purpose of liquidating their former holdings in what is now Israel and then leaving.

It is hard, I say, to estimate what percentage would choose to return to what is now Israel. However, I am mindful in this connection of an encounter which I had several years ago with one of the leaders and spokesmen of the Arab refugees, who, when asked how many refugees would choose repatriation, quickly and emphatically said, “98 percent.” But, when I asked him how *he* would vote, he hastily assured me that he would be in the 2 percent. It seems to those of us who have had long association with this unhappy problem that to many, many refugees the right to say whether they will go back to their former homes is more important than actually going back.

#### **The Problem for Israel**

The problem for Israel by granting an option to the refugees to return is obvious. The paragraph of the December 11, 1948, resolution, which

I have already mentioned, makes it clear that, if the refugees are to return to their former homes, it would be with the understanding that they would live in peace with their neighbors. It is not easy to envisage the likelihood, under this specific stipulation, of any sudden or substantial repatriation actually occurring. Unfortunately the distrust and enmity which have persisted between the Arabs and the Israelis make the problem of the internal security of the state rightfully a matter of concern to the Government of Israel if Arab refugees, whose peaceful intentions were not known, were suddenly to return to their former homes. Certainly a large body of hostilely inclined Arab refugees in Israel would not be the implementation in fact or intent of the 1948 resolution. On the other hand, we would do well to bear in mind that many Arab refugees undoubtedly would not care who governed the country so long as they could govern their own little piece of land once again.

Another serious problem for Israel and the refugee alike is that a program of repatriation tends to imply something which the passage of years now may no longer permit; namely, that the Arab refugee's home and property still remain where he left them. In far, far too many cases the refugee would return to find his home gone and in its place probably some entirely new and thoroughly alien modern community. I make this comment purely as an objective understanding of what has happened, not as a justification. The Israelis have changed the face of what is now Israel, and there is little wisdom in letting an Arab refugee continue to delude himself that, simply because he chooses to be repatriated, his home and property will be waiting for him once he has exercised his option.

Obviously, if there is no point in deluding him, there is a clear point in seeing to it that he understands what the likelihoods are and that Israel will pay him fair compensation for what was rightfully his. If the Arab refugees could be thus fairly dealt with, it is reasonable to assume that by far the largest part of them would probably decide that their future happiness lay among their Arab brethren with whom they could work toward a strong and prosperous Arab world.

I have pointed out, I believe, that both the Arab states and Israel have genuine problems to cope with in any solution of the refugee problem, but I submit that these problems are not insuperable

and the governments concerned know they are not. It is hard to believe that in their own private councils they have not faced up to these problems and have not made at least some preliminary plans as to how they would cope with them. Sooner or later they are going to have to produce these plans, and in their own self-interest it would seem wise that this be done sooner rather than later.

#### **No Reason for Renewing UNRWA's Life**

On June 30, 1960, the legal authority of the mandate of UNRWA will expire. It may appear easy to the parties concerned, and perhaps to some other delegations of the United Nations, to shrug at this prospect and suggest that the agency's mandate merely be renewed. Such thinking is unrealistic. It has been increasingly obvious to us, and to those nations who by their contributions to the agency have continually demonstrated their friendship for Israel and the Arab host governments, that there is already no enthusiasm among the majority of the members of the United Nations for the perpetuation of an ugly political deadlock through the mere renewal of UNRWA's mandate.

I would point out that, while the United States bows to no nation in its humanitarian concern for mankind, there is no presently demonstrable reason why it should join in continuing UNRWA's life in the face of such a political prospect. As I have already indicated, the United States reluctantly agreed to the renewal of UNRWA's mandate in 1954 because at that time it hoped, and it made clear its hope, that agreement would be reached and work would be started on the major rehabilitation projects of the Jordan Valley and Sinai. We have honored our undertaking in the renewal of UNRWA's mandate. The parties directly concerned, therefore, have little basis for assuming that the United States and other major contributors will wish either to continue the present state of affairs or support any new proposals for the welfare of the refugees if they—Israel and the Arab states—are not prepared in good faith to take upon themselves a prompt and far greater responsibility for the solution of the refugee problem than they have up to now.

If, on the other hand, Israel and the Arab host governments are prepared to take upon themselves these greater responsibilities, they will find

that we will not lack in imagination and resources in assisting them to make the Arab refugee what he ought to be and can be: a self-respecting, self-sustaining asset to the future of the Middle East. Failure to look upon him in this way, I submit, is morally, politically, and economically wrong.

### **U.N. Command Rejects Communist Proposal on Withdrawal of Forces**

*At a meeting of the Korean Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on October 27 a representative of the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers stated that the withdrawal of the CPV from north Korea was completed on October 26; that the CPV would retain a representative on the Armistice Commission; and that withdrawal of the CPV forces was proof of KPA/CPV sincerity in observing the armistice agreement. He then accused south Korea and the United States of rejecting the "reasonable" proposal of the KPA/CPV for withdrawal of foreign troops and peaceful unification of Korea and demanded that all foreign troops be withdrawn from south Korea.*

*Following is the text of the U.N. Command's reply.*

Your statement is noted.

You have wasted our time with a long and tedious statement on political matters which exceed the military scope of this commission. Since your statement is filled with gross distortions of the facts, I am compelled to comment on the withdrawal-of-forces aspect to set the record straight.

Your side has repeatedly expressed the view that there can be no peaceful unification of Korea until such time as all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Korea. Let me remind you that there were no foreign combat forces in Korea on the 25th of June 1950, when the armed forces of your side launched a savage and unprovoked attack against the free people of the Republic of Korea. This wanton act of aggression so shocked the conscience of the world that the United Nations called upon all member nations to come to the assistance of the Republic of Korea and restore international peace and security in the area.

Faced with certain defeat in the fall of 1950, your side introduced the so-called Chinese People's

Volunteers into the conflict, thereby compounding your crime.

If the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers has been completed as you claim, such action will only be regarded as compliance at least with one part of a United Nations General Assembly resolution of February the first, 1951. This resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by 44 nations. Such compliance, therefore, has long been awaited by the United Nations and by world public opinion.

It is well known that the governments of the United Nations Command have indicated that they continue to regard the frustration of the hopes of the Korean people for unification of their country as the basic problem in Korea. These governments set forth in detail at the 1954 Geneva conference their position regarding just settlement of this problem in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations. As your side is well aware, the broad objectives of the United Nations are, of course, to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. These objectives were endorsed in subsequent years by the United Nations General Assembly. Your side has shown no evidence that it is prepared to approach the problem of Korean unification on the basis of these objectives. Instead, you continue to exploit the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers in connection with the unification question for propaganda purposes only.

If your side is sincerely interested in settling the Korean question, you have only to indicate through proper channels your willingness to discuss the problem on the basis of the United Nations objectives instead of blocking such efforts by your characteristic intransigence.

Your side is fully aware that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea must be settled through a political conference at a higher level. Therefore, I demand once again that your side limit its discussions in meetings of this Commission to those military matters which are clearly within the purview of the Military Armistice Commission.

Your demand for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from south Korea including the U.S. forces is rejected.

## U.S.-U.K. Scientific Panel To Visit Africa

Press release 681 dated October 31

J. H. Smith, Jr., Director of the International Cooperation Administration, accompanied by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and a panel of American and British scientists will visit several African states and territories by plane November 2 to 22.

Although Mr. Smith and Mr. Satterthwaite have both been in Africa before, this is the first time they have visited that continent in their present official capacities. Mr. Smith will consult with International Cooperation Administration personnel in the countries to be visited on the operation of ICA programs there. Mr. Satterthwaite will concern himself primarily with Foreign Service operations during the trip.

An important purpose of the trip is to confer with the host-country representatives, both governmental and nongovernmental, on the types of problems confronting the peoples of the area and the extent to which available technology or new efforts in scientific research can be helpful in solving them.

The scientific party will include: J. G. Harrar, Rockefeller Foundation; Richard Bradfield, Cornell University; John M. Weir, Rockefeller Foundation; B. G. Maegraith, University of Liverpool; Dunstan Skilbeck, principal, Wye College of Agriculture, University of London.

The British professors will join the party in Africa. The fields represented by the scientists are tropical medicine, agronomy, and plant pathology.

The countries to be visited include Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Tunisia.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 85th Congress, 1st Session

**The Right to Travel.** Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. Res. 49, as Extended by S. Res. 234. A Survey of the Extent to Which Constitutional Rights are Being Respected in the Issuance, Limitation of Use, Denial, and Revocation of American Passports. March 29, 1957. 55 pp.

### 85th Congress, 2d Session

**International Rules of Judicial Procedure.** Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4642 to Establish a Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. July 15, 1958. 23 pp.

**Merchant Marine Legislation.** Hearing Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 474, H. R. 8129, H. R. 8382, and H. R. 13153. August 13, 1958. 80 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Indo-Pacific Fisheries

Agreement for the establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council. Formulated at Baguio February 26, 1948. Entered into force November 9, 1948. TIAS 1895.

*Acceptance deposited:* Federation of Malaya, September 15, 1958.

##### Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone;<sup>1</sup>

Convention on the high seas;<sup>1</sup>

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas;<sup>1</sup>

Convention on the continental shelf;<sup>1</sup>

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes.<sup>2</sup>

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

*Signature:* Bolivia, October 17, 1958.

##### Rice

Amended Constitution of the International Rice Commission, and Rules of Procedure. Approved by the 7th session of the FAO Conference at Rome December 10, 1953. Entered into force December 10, 1953. TIAS 3046.

*Acceptance deposited:* Federation of Malaya, September 15, 1958.

#### BILATERAL

##### United Kingdom

Supplementary protocol amending the income-tax convention of April 16, 1945 (TIAS 1546) as modified by supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946 (TIAS 1546) and May 25, 1954 (TIAS 3165). Signed at Washington August 19, 1957. Entered into force October 15, 1958. *Proclaimed by the President:* October 24, 1958.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the U.S.

## United Nations Committee Adopts Three Resolutions on Testing and Surprise Attack

*Following is a series of statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper and Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representatives to the General Assembly, together with the texts of three resolutions adopted by the committee on November 1.<sup>1</sup>*

### STATEMENT BY SENATOR HICKENLOOPER, OCTOBER 28

U.S. delegation press release 3043

I deem it a privilege to address this body. I have asked for the floor today as a member of the delegation of the United States, since disarmament is a problem very close to my heart. Because my primary responsibility in the General Assembly lies elsewhere, I have not been able to participate in all of the proceedings of this committee. I have, however, followed the discussion with great interest.

I wish to state that I shall not reply to yesterday's statement by the representative of the U.S.S.R., although I am sure the United States will have something to say on that score at an appropriate time.

As a member of the United States Senate, as former chairman and as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy since its establishment, and as a member of the Senate Special Subcommittee on Disarmament, I have had opportunity for rather varied and often intimate exposure to the questions of armament and disarmament, especially in atomic areas. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make

some observations concerning the subject now before this committee.

I cannot overemphasize the importance the people of the United States, the Congress, and my Government attach to the disarmament question. I can assure you that we recognize this as one of the most pressing issues confronting mankind today. We believe that every effort to achieve a controlled and properly balanced reduction of the weapons of war must be made in the interest of a progressive human society. We seek, through disarmament, progress toward the goal of a just and peaceful world. The ever-present specter of another world conflict must be exorcised. The quest for a way out of the present impasse and the relief of international tensions reflects the deepest and most sincere aspirations of the American people.

The United States is, of course, willing to do whatever the defense of freedom requires, but we zealously strive for a climate in which we and the world may be relieved of the tremendous armaments burden which the present world situation demands of us. We never cease to hope that a way can be found so that those countries which cherish liberty can feel secure in their independence and can devote their energy and resources to the peaceful development of their own and their neighbors' well-being. We believe this goal can be achieved through good-faith agreement on balanced worldwide arms limitation with effective controls. We recognize that this may be a long-range objective and that there are difficulties in the way of its achievement; yet we are convinced that this goal can be attained. We believe that the logical way to proceed is through realistic steps cautiously measured and carefully taken.

<sup>1</sup>For earlier statements by U.S. representatives in Committee I, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1958, p. 686, and Nov. 10, 1958, p. 747.

### Testing of Atomic Weapons

I have been impressed by the amount of discussion in this committee devoted to the question of halting nuclear weapons tests. This is widely regarded as an initial step toward real disarmament, and it may well be so. I believe that the Chinese have a saying to the effect that a journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step. However, that first step will be only a gesture unless it leads to successive steps toward the goal.

The United States agrees that the matter of suspension or stopping of atomic weapons testing is of importance, but standing alone it can be only a timid action in the direction of realistic and reliable disarmament. We pray that the Geneva conference on this subject that begins on the 31st of this month will be fruitful. We are devoting our energy to its success.

Because of our great interest in this matter, I want to devote most of my remarks to this topic and its relationship to disarmament.

### Stopping Tests Is Not Disarmament

It is true that an end to nuclear weapons tests may tend to limit the variety of nuclear weapons which could be developed. However, it by no means follows that, if tests are stopped, existing weapons stockpiles will be reduced or that the manufacture of nuclear weapons will cease. We must face the fact that, while it might improve the political or psychological climate, a discontinuance of nuclear testing is not the crux of the disarmament problem. An agreement on test suspension can be basically significant only insofar as it contributes to and is integrated with progress on actual disarmament.

The distinguished delegate of Peru, Mr. [Victor Andres] Belaúnde, put it brilliantly: He said that if we set up a table of values in which the only essential question was the suspension of tests, then we would be putting at the end, almost as a footnote, the cessation of production, destruction of stockpiles, and so forth. He added that, "This would give humanity a mistaken idea. . . . We cannot give mankind the idea that, because we have encouraged and will encourage negotiations in Geneva, we have solved everything or have laid the foundation for a final solution of the question."

I certainly agree with his thought that we can really take heart only when we are sure that the

world is moving toward a realistic arms-limitation agreement.

The distinguished delegate of Cuba, Mr. [Emilio] Núñez-Portuondo, a few days ago [October 21] in his excellent address before this committee, clearly pointed out a basic problem in connection with disarmament. He showed clearly and convincingly that the cessation of atomic tests or atomic disarmament would only shift the balance of power, from a military standpoint, especially on the Eurasian continent, to those nations which would still maintain vast reservoirs of manpower and so-called conventional means of waging war.

Now the United States would like to see the world situation develop so that never again will it be necessary to conduct nuclear tests. Mr. Lodge has already expressed the United States Government's hope that a permanent test cessation will prove possible. As my Government stated in its note to the Soviet Union on October 20,<sup>2</sup>

It is the sincere hope of the United States that the [Geneva] conference will make sufficient progress to justify the expectation that the final termination of all nuclear weapons test explosions may in due course be achieved.

As an elected representative of the American people, I wish to state that I wholeheartedly share this hope.

### Relationship of Tests to Disarmament

As my Government has emphasized here, what is necessary to translate this hope into reality is that reasonable progress be made on real disarmament measures. Much has been made of this principle on which our policy is based. I believe it appropriate, therefore, to restate the United States position. We know that the Soviet bloc maintains substantially larger conventional forces than the West. We know too that this advantage is offset by nuclear power. If the United States is to renounce its ability to maintain an adequate posture of defensive strength through atomic power, then there must be adequate assurance that other means of waging war which would give other nations definite superiority be diminished through balanced disarmament measures. In effect the relationship between conventional and nuclear armaments requires that equitable reductions in both

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1958, p. 723.

fields take place. We recognize that states will not accept disarmament measures which give the opposing side a definite military advantage. We could not ourselves accept such steps. We do not expect that others will agree to them. This is why we stress the point that nuclear tests must be viewed in their proper perspective, that is, in their relationship to the disarmament problem as a whole.

In other words, we are willing to forgo improvement of our defensive capability and versatility, which a continuation of tests would bring, so long as we have assurances that nations are definitely moving toward the desired goal of effective, equitable disarmament.

I believe the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. [Sidney E.] Smith, in his address of October 20, summed up our position most accurately. He said, "... we should realize that serious risks are involved for those countries which have sought to turn their manpower to productive purposes and are forced to rely on modern arms for their security. The offer of the United States and the United Kingdom should not be underestimated. It is a daring step in a perilous international situation."

Having said this, I should like to review quickly what the United States has done in an attempt to make a test suspension possible.

At the end of the 1957 London disarmament conference, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada presented proposals for partial measures of disarmament.<sup>3</sup> They called for simultaneous progress on four major measures of disarmament and the question of nuclear weapons tests.

I might add that these proposals included specific recommendations for convening groups of technical experts to study the feasibility and practicability of inspection systems required to adequately monitor and control agreements reached in any of these areas. All of us know where this initiative has led. The Geneva technical conference on detecting violations of nuclear tests has concluded successfully. A technical conference on surprise attack is about to begin.

Now, with respect to the testing question. The four-power paper proposed a suspension of nuclear tests for a 12-month period, provided that at the end of that time an effective inspection system to

verify the suspension has been installed and is in operation. In such case, the suspension would continue for another 12 months, provided that satisfactory progress was being made in establishing an inspection system for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes to enable a "cutoff" to be put into effect at the end of that period.

Since that time our position has been modified. We are suspending nuclear weapons testing unilaterally for 1 year commencing with the October 31 negotiations, provided that the Soviet Union does not test during this period. We are ready to extend this suspension without limitation. We ask only that each year the parties to the agreement are satisfied that the inspection system is working effectively and that reasonable progress is being made on real disarmament measures.

Our forward stride is readily apparent. Today for an indefinite discontinuance we ask only that a reliable control system be established and that progress be made each year in the area of disarmament. Are these two principles unreasonable? Are they undesirable? I think not. Why did we make this compromise? In simple terms, we want the present encouraging momentum to continue.

#### **The Need for Control**

Both sides are agreed on the need for a control system. While the Soviet Union has stated it agrees with the principle of controls, nevertheless, the Soviet Union's position as set forth in the draft resolution [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.203 and Corr. 1] pending before this body leaves room for doubt as to how vital it believes a control system to be. One is compelled to wonder why the Soviet resolution fails to mention either the forthcoming Geneva negotiations or the principles of controls. Even in the latest revised, or, as the Soviets call it, the "corrected" version of their draft resolution which has been circulated here, there is still no reference to these salient questions. I hope this is only an oversight.

I should like to discuss for a moment the importance we attach to this problem of control. Throughout the long disarmament discussions in this organization, one fact has been apparent. If there is to be progress on any disarmament measures, a basis of mutual confidence must be established. Without trust there can be no disarmament. This trust must be based on facts and

<sup>3</sup>For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

not on words alone. Consequently any agreement reached must be implemented by controls so as to assure each state of the continuing good faith of others party to the agreement. Without this means of verification, the fears and suspicions which already exist would continue to fester and the infection would spread. In fact, what would an agreement to suspend tests without adequate controls amount to? In my opinion it would be worse than no agreement at all. Small-scale tests of from 1 to 5 kilotons could be conducted with a minimum chance of detection. Moreover there is a problem not only of detection of explosions but also of identification as atomic or other types.

For example, a state of uncertainty could be repeatedly created by earthquakes, which might be interpreted as underground nuclear explosions. In fact a percentage of earthquakes create shock waves which are also characteristic of subsurface explosions, and a seismograph cannot differentiate. In such cases free access to and inspection of the site is essential. I cite these examples only to point out that, without an effective control system to verify compliance with the agreement, mistrust would undoubtedly be greater than under the present circumstances.

In the interest of creating this necessary foundation of trust, the United States has insisted on controls. Only when each party to the agreement can be reasonably assured of compliance by the others, can international tension be lessened and a greater degree of confidence gained.

As we have heretofore stated in this body, we accept the control system recommended by the scientists at Geneva this summer.<sup>4</sup> We believe that the establishment of such a system of detection and control is essential and therefore attach the greatest importance to the negotiations beginning this week in Geneva. There are two basic reasons for needing such a control system. First, it would reassure each side that the agreement was in fact being carried out. Second, it would deter any country from violating the agreement. No one could be sure that even the smallest yield test might not be detected.

The United States believes that for these reasons a control system to verify a test-suspension agreement must be operating as soon as practi-

cable. Such a control system could be installed and working within a reasonable period of time. We, for our part, are prepared to proceed as soon as an agreement is reached. In furtherance of this position the United States has stated its willingness to suspend, unilaterally, nuclear tests for 1 year, believing that within that period a test-suspension agreement can be negotiated and a necessary beginning made on the establishment of an international control system. This, to me, represents a logical approach.

As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, I wished to speak directly to the matter of nuclear weapons tests. However, in concluding, I want to reemphasize that the basic objective of my country is reliable peace and disarmament.

We sincerely believe that progress in all areas of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, must be achieved. As we have repeatedly demonstrated, we are ready and willing to explore and move along any road that holds out the possibility of achieving progress. In this regard we view an agreement on halting nuclear weapons tests as an important part of any program leading to disarmament.

We would but deceive ourselves, however, if we let an agreement on test suspension blind us to the need for further progress on disarmament.

Therefore, I hope the United Nations will endorse the progress that has been achieved to date. But, more important, I hope the United Nations will continue to make every effort to achieve a worldwide system of balanced and controlled disarmament.

We do not expect miracles—but we must not accept stagnation.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, may I advert to a page of history and again recall certain events, namely, an offer unique in the annals of nations.

World War II ended with the United States in sole possession of atomic weapons and the means to produce them. My country also had the most powerful military force—land, sea, and air—the world had ever seen. We were fully aware of this power, and had our policies been aggressive we no doubt could have imposed our will by force upon any country. But we have no aggressive intentions toward any nation. We are a nation dedicated to peace, freedom, and human dignity. We respect the honor of nations founded on the free choice of their citizens.

<sup>4</sup>For text of the report adopted by the conference of technical experts, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

With full realization of the power of atomic weapons, then, and the vast potential of future weapons, we knew that an atomic war might well destroy civilization, and we felt that every effort should be made to forestall such a possibility.

Accordingly we made a sincere proposal unique in the history of the world. Through Mr. Bernard Baruch, as United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, we proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority whose functions would include:

1. Control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Control, inspection, and licensing of all other atomic activities.
3. Fostering of the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development activities intended to put the authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge, thus enabling it to comprehend, and therefore detect, any misuse of atomic energy.
5. Power to control nuclear raw materials and primary nuclear production plants.

Operation of the system would have been by an international civil service, and "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" was to be provided for violators. Under this proposal the manufacture of atomic weapons would have ceased; all existing weapons, then held exclusively by the United States, would have been destroyed as weapons and the useful nuclear material transferred to the international agency for peaceful purposes.

In 1948 we will recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations formally approved the essential elements of the United States proposal. However, and tragically, the Soviet Union cavalierly rejected this proposal and intensified its drive for the production of atomic instruments of war.

I am not aware of any other instance in history when a nation offered to give up a weapon or an instrumentality of war within its exclusive possession, which could dominate the world. We can only speculate what the posture of the world today might have been had the Kremlin cooperated and accepted in good faith this program designed to advance the cause of peace and freedom. We do not ask any nation to do any-

thing which we are not willing to do ourselves.

In spite of the fact, however, that the task of waging peace and reducing world tensions has multiplied manifold, we and the peace-loving nations must redouble our efforts and must continue to dedicate our hearts and minds to the accomplishment of this goal.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 29

U.S. delegation press release 8045

From the outset of this debate the United States has tried to act constructively and open-mindedly to achieve the objectives which are so much desired by all members of the United Nations. In all of our statements, therefore, we have tried to put forward ideas for carrying out these objectives and to avoid criticisms and recriminations.

It is really too bad that it should again be necessary to take the floor because the representative of the Soviet Union has so attacked the United States and so distorted its position. But he has done it, and so I must set the record straight.

Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin would have you believe that the United States is opposed to the cessation of nuclear tests, to disarmament generally, and to the cutting of military budgets. The members of this committee are far too experienced to be taken in by allegations which in all frankness can only be described as grotesque. Let me itemize.

1. Mr. Zorin's statements run completely contrary to previous Soviet positions on nuclear tests. At the last General Assembly the Soviet Union called for a 2- or 3-year moratorium on tests with adequate controls—not paper promises to control—under the supervision of an international commission. But now they will not be satisfied with this.

Mr. Zorin said in his statement on Monday [October 27] that "the Soviet government proceeds from the fact that the cessation of such tests should not be made dependent on whether an agreement is reached or not" at the forthcoming conference at Geneva. Mr. Zorin's statements now seem to mean that, although they give lip service to the idea of control, they really want a permanent uncontrolled cessation of nuclear tests. This is not a question of conditions. This is a question of whether you are really going to cease or whether you are not going to cease. The only way you can be sure it is real is if you have got

controls in effect, not a paper promise that is adopted here in a resolution some afternoon. And so it happens when our position was modified—when we moved toward the Soviet position of last year—then the Soviet Union shifted its position in favor of something which they knew would be impossible to carry out. That sounds fantastic, but that is what has happened.

#### **Soviet Test Cessation Announcement**

2. Then—and please note this—the Soviet Union unilateral test cessation announcement<sup>6</sup> was made well after the United States publicly announced that we would hold a series of tests in 1958. The Soviet so-called “offer” was conditioned—and I use the word “conditioned” advisedly—on the United States and the United Kingdom ceasing their tests, which we had already announced we would hold. In the light of our prior public announcement on our testing program the Soviet Union knew perfectly well that they could not possibly be called upon to carry out the intention which they had so blithely announced.

3. Then the Soviet representative has repeatedly stated here that a year is required to prepare for a new series of nuclear tests. Only 6 months after the March 31 announcement they resumed testing. If we accept the Soviet statement that preparations for a test series require 1 year, then we could only assume that in the fall of 1957, 5 months prior to their unilateral announcement in March 1958, they were planning their present resumption of tests. From the size and from the scale of the current Soviet series it is obvious that their test preparations were not in the slightest bit interrupted or slowed down.

4. The Soviet representative has misrepresented the position of the United States on the matter of a continuation of the test suspension beyond the first year. And this is a very fundamental point. He had implied that we have placed insurmountable obstacles in the way of an indefinite discontinuance of weapons tests. But this is not the case.

We have pointed out here that we shall suspend tests for 1 year beginning October 31, provided the Soviet Union does likewise. And the Soviet representative apparently has not understood that it is reasonable to expect that in effect this could mean and could amount to an immediate 2-year

halt. I say this for this reason: We expect that during the first year an agreement on a test suspension under effective controls can be reached. In the following year we would install the agreed control system. From this point on, that is, after an initial 2-year period, the halt could be continued indefinitely, provided that a simple set of specifications can be made to work. These specifications are clear and precise. They are specifications which any nation negotiating in good faith should be willing to endorse and support. It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union insists on taking issue with principles that it in effect has stated time and again in the past are necessary and desirable.

5. They claim they are ready to halt tests under an effective control system. But they balk at a proposal which asks that each year parties to the agreement be satisfied that the system is working satisfactorily. They claim they are always ready to achieve agreements on disarmament measures, but they balk at a proposal which asks that each year parties to the agreement be satisfied that reasonable progress is being made on these vital measures. Now those are very striking contradictions, and no reason for these contradictory attitudes has been given by the Soviet representative.

#### **A Play on Words**

6. Mr. Zorin attempted to suggest to this body that the United States and the United Kingdom were intriguing against the Soviet Union. He based this innuendo on what can only be regarded as a play on words—on the fact that the United States has called for progress on “arms control measures” while the United Kingdom has asked for progress on “real disarmament.” Because the United States wants to control armaments, it is, according to Mr. Zorin, promoting an arms race. It is just like saying that because a doctor deals with illness he is in favor of disease. It is just exactly the same logic. If quibbles like this are what really bother Mr. Zorin, the United States is ready to assure him that for us the United Kingdom’s phrase “real disarmament” has no different meaning than “arms control measures” in statements of the United States Government, if that is what Mr. Zorin is prepared to accept. So much for that.

7. Mr. Zorin says that the United States has remained silent on the Soviet resolution concern-

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1958, p. 646.

ing the reduction of military budgets from 10 to 15 percent [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.204]. This is one charge of his which I shall not deny. I have remained silent because the Soviet resolution on this matter was so transparent and so specious that I did not consider that it deserved serious comment. But there are facts I can cite now which will show exactly what I mean and exactly what the true position of the United States is. From the largest military budget and greatest armed forces in history at the end of World War II, the United States reduced its defense expenditures consistently and drastically until the Communist aggression in Korea. Now that is a great big fact. Compare this with the Soviet Union, whose expenditures for military purposes have meant and mean today that the Soviet people have been denied and are being denied the decent standard of living which their land, their great land, with all its natural wealth, could provide them. We are eager to see military expenditures reduced, and we will agree to reductions to the fullest extent possible as a result of disarmament. President Eisenhower made this clear soon after his inauguration in April 1953 when he proposed that the savings from disarmament be put into a fund to help the underdeveloped countries. I believe the amendment to the 17-power resolution introduced by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatamala, Haiti, and Uruguay [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.209] offers a satisfactory and sensible approach to this question, and we support it.

Mr. Chairman, despite these recent discouraging Soviet statements the United States delegation is now on its way to the October 31 Geneva meeting. The delegation's instructions are to make every effort to conclude an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the establishment of an international control system on the basis of the Geneva experts' report. We hope sincerely that the Soviet delegation will also have similar instructions.

#### **Record of Soviet Rejections**

Now, Mr. President, before I relinquish the floor let me just try to put this situation for a minute into a broader background. It is often said that most people have short memories, but we who give up all of our time to these great questions of peace and security for the world cannot

forget some of the things that have happened in the past 10 years.

Yesterday Senator Hickenlooper, who sat in this seat, recalled the offer which Bernard Baruch made when he was representing the United States and at a time when the United States had the sole monopoly of the atomic bomb. We offered to give up this advantage of ours and turn everything over to an international agency.

But this idea was wrecked, wrecked by the Soviet Union.

When I was in the Senate just after the war, the United States created the Marshall plan to rebuild Europe after the devastation of World War II. The Soviet Union was invited to help in this great international humanitarian effort.

But this too was rejected by the Soviet Union.

In 1955 President Eisenhower suggested the open-skies plan, whereby the danger of surprise attack would be virtually eliminated by both countries agreeing to a system of aerial and ground inspection.

But this plan was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Last winter the Soviet Union complained about flights over the Arctic. We made a proposal in the Security Council\* which was supported by all the members of the Security Council—except one—the Soviet Union, which cast its veto and destroyed this most promising beginning toward lessening international tension and overcoming the fear of surprise attack.

And now, Mr. President, we have put forward a proposal for the discontinuance of nuclear tests [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.205]. There is nothing wrong with our proposal. It is honest; it is clear. It has been lying right here on the table for 3 weeks, and every member has had a chance to scrutinize it and to turn it upside down and look at it and see what makes it tick. It is a good-faith proposal. It is the indispensable first step. And yet, if we take Mr. Zorin's words as final, the Soviet Union is rejecting this too.

Now, Mr. Chairman, how can one account for this succession of Soviet actions to prevent the world from advancing toward peace?

Is it because they run their affairs in accordance with some old book written more than a century ago by Karl Marx—a book which has always been inapplicable to the United States and is also obsolete as far as the rest of the world is concerned?

\* *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

Is it because they foolishly think of the United States as a capitalistic country which stands in the way of Soviet progress? The United States is not a capitalistic country. As the great French philosopher Jacques Maritain has said, the United States is a country of economic humanism. The United States wants nothing but health and happiness for the people in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet representative often complains because they get defeated in the United Nations. The reason that they get defeated is not because there is any automatic majority against them. Except for the Soviet bloc, there are no satellites. There is no automatic voting in the United Nations. The Soviet Union could very easily be on the winning side here at the United Nations—if they would simply change their policy. It is just as simple as that, and we would like to see them on the winning side on that basis.

If they just give up this philosophy that "everybody is out of step but me," they would be happier, they would be more prosperous, they would be stronger, and the world would advance toward peace.

There is still time to take this turn. The meeting is opening at Geneva on October 31. We hope that you will be there from the Soviet Union, that you will give up these antiquated ideas, and that you will move forward with the rest of us.

#### **FIRST STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 31**

U.S. delegation press release 3049

We have all heard the statements made by the representatives of Japan, Sweden, and Austria introducing the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.213. They appealed in the interests of success in the Geneva negotiations for all members of the General Assembly to support this resolution and for the sponsors of other resolutions on testing to refrain from pressing them to the vote, in the interests of this conciliatory approach.

Mr. Chairman, as soon as we were informed of the decision of those delegations to introduce this resolution, the 17 powers in, I may say, the same spirit of conciliation which they have shown toward previous efforts to reach a compromise, met to consider their position.

On behalf of the 17 cosponsors, I am authorized to say that we would support this resolution

and would give it precedence over our motion for priority, if the sponsors of other resolutions dealing with the testing question agree to withdraw them or not to press them to a vote.

The cosponsors of the 17-power resolution [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.205] are prepared to take such action with respect to their resolution and to deal with the surprise attack and disarmament aspects of that resolution by introducing a revision of the 12-power resolution [U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.202]. We hope that, in the interest of the Geneva negotiations, the other cosponsors of resolutions dealing with testing will agree to withdraw theirs also.

We think that, if the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish resolution were adopted today and we thereupon completed our debate on this issue, it would be the most constructive thing the General Assembly could do for the Geneva negotiations.

We are willing to accept this compromise despite our firm belief that the 17-power resolution is the one which the committee would, and should, otherwise adopt.

The compromise resolution, we think, would encourage the work in Geneva, and it is better not to try to duplicate their efforts there. Of course, if the sponsors of other resolutions on testing insist that their resolutions be put to a vote, my motion for priority for the 17-power resolution would naturally still stand, and in that case, of course, I would have to press it.

#### **SECOND STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 31**

U.S. delegation press release 3050

It appears to me that we are getting close to the voting stage, and I therefore wish to explain the position of the United States on all of the principal substantive resolutions pending before the committee. I had hoped that this would not be necessary, frankly, but since the sponsors of other testing resolutions refuse to accept our offer to support the Austrian-Japanese-Swedish resolution in lieu of all others, I am left with no other choice.

The United States will vote against the Soviet resolution, A/C.1/L.203. As I have stated here before, we cannot accept a resolution calling for an end to nuclear weapons tests which purposely overlooks the need for any control. Such a resolu-

tion would be a hoax on the people of the world. But we do not reject the resolution on this point alone. The Soviet resolution does not even mention the Geneva talks, the forum which offers the greatest hope that an agreement on this matter can be reached. I think it is crystal clear by this time, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union wants a mere paper promise, whereas we want real, actual stoppage. I do not think the Soviet position deludes anyone, and the difference between us is the difference between the shadow and the substance.

The United States will also vote against the 13-power resolution, A/C.1/L.202.<sup>7</sup> This resolution recognizes the importance of an agreement on controls. However, it calls for an unconditional ending of tests until such an agreement is reached. Now, Mr. Chairman, this would strengthen the hand of those who may not want to reach agreement in Geneva on a suspension of tests under effective international controls. It would make it possible to avoid controls entirely by insisting on an unconditional cessation pure and simple. We have pointed out in this debate that this would be worse than no agreement at all. The fact that the word "pending" in the original draft of this resolution was subsequently changed to the word "until" makes it clear that the intent of this resolution also is that there should be a discontinuance of tests whether or not controls are established.

We will vote for the Austrian-Swedish-Japanese text, A/C.1/L.213. We think that these three states are to be commended for this effort. It expresses a sentiment which we all share and which we should relay to the parties now assembled in Geneva.

With respect to the 17-power text, for which I have made a formal motion for priority and which is, I believe, the pending question before this committee now, the cosponsors accept the amendment proposed by several Latin American delegations in document A/C.1/L.209, and we will incorporate it in the resolution. This constitutes a sensible approach to the use of savings which would be effected by genuine disarmament measures.

We will have to vote against the amendments to the 17-power resolution presented by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Ireland in document A/C.1/L.207. We share his basic objectives. We

<sup>7</sup> Ethiopia joined the sponsors of the 12-power draft resolution on Oct. 15.

do not believe this is the context in which this objective should be achieved. We cannot accept any obligations the observance of which could not be verified. The Irish proposals seem to us obviously deficient in this regard.

We shall also vote against the Irish resolution A/C.1/L.206 for the same reasons. Our objective is to provide a context in which states can make an undertaking on nuclear weapons problems with the full knowledge that its observance can be assured without jeopardizing its own safety. This can be accomplished as part of a concerted action. An *ad hoc* committee to study the problem of the transfer of weapons would, in effect, be a committee to examine the entire disarmament problem. This would but complicate matters and duplicate the work of the Disarmament Commission.

We will also vote against the Soviet resolution on military budgets contained in A/C.1/L.204. A reduction of military expenditures will come in connection with real agreement on disarmament measures. We regard the Soviet resolution as a completely transparent maneuver designed solely for a propaganda purpose.

We will vote for the Indian-Yugoslav resolution, A/C.1/L.211, on surprise attack. It reflects the same ideas contained in the 17-power draft, and we see no objection to restating these ideas in a separate resolution if the sponsors wish to put it to a vote.

This leaves the question of United Nations machinery on disarmament. There are two resolutions on this question—the Mexican draft, A/C.1/L.208 and the Indian-Yugoslav draft, A/C.1/L.210. We think that something might be worked out on this problem which would be genuinely acceptable. I suggest, therefore, that this particular matter not be put to a vote today, as we have all been busy with these other things. But I am sure that can be worked out by early next week.

## TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

### 17-Power Resolution on Testing and Surprise Attack<sup>8</sup>

*The General Assembly,*  
*Reaffirming* the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, which

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.205, as amended (A/C.1/L.209); adopted in Committee I on Oct. 31 by a vote of 49 to 9 with 23 abstentions.

have found expression in the Charter and in previous resolutions of the General Assembly,

*Welcoming* the agreement which has been achieved in the "Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests",

*Noting* that negotiations on the suspension on nuclear weapons tests and on the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report will begin on 31 October,

*Noting further* that qualified persons are expected to meet soon to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack,

*Recognizing* that these developments are encouraging steps in the direction of progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments, which may assist in promoting the fundamental aims of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

#### A

1. *Urges* that in the negotiations between states that have tested nuclear weapons the parties make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control,

2. *Urges* the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress,

#### B

3. *Calls* attention to the importance and urgency of achieving the widest possible measure of agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack,

#### C

4. *Expresses* determination that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament,

#### D

5. *Invites* the conferences on nuclear weapons tests and on surprise attack to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General and requests them to keep the United Nations informed,

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments concerned to render whatever advice and assistance may seem appropriate to facilitate current developments or any further initiatives related to problems of disarmament,

7. *Requests* that the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which various aspects of disarmament were discussed be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the participants in the conferences on nuclear weapons tests and on surprise attack.

#### E

8. *Reiterates* to the States concerned the invitation made in resolution 1148 (XII), of 14 November 1957, to

devote, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries.

### Austrian-Japanese-Swedish Resolution on Testing<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Welcoming* the report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests,

*Welcoming further* the decision of the States which have tested nuclear weapons to meet in a conference at Geneva commencing 31 October 1958, concerning the question of nuclear weapons tests,

1. *Expresses* the hope that the conference will be successful and lead to an agreement acceptable to all;

2. *Requests* the parties concerned to report to the General Assembly the agreement that may be the result of their negotiations;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance and provide such services as may be asked for by the conference commencing at Geneva on 31 October 1958.

### Indian-Yugoslav Resolution on Surprise Attack<sup>10</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting* the agreement among certain States to meet to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack,

1. *Expresses* the hope that the widest possible measure of agreement will be achieved in the forthcoming study;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance and provide such services as may be asked for and required by this Conference;

3. *Requests* the States participating in the study to inform the United Nations of the progress achieved.

### Mr. Gabriel Named Representative to 10th Session of UNESCO

The White House on October 31 announced the recess appointment by the President of Ralph H. Gabriel to be an alternate representative to the 10th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 213; adopted in Committee I on Oct. 31 by a vote of 52 to 9 with 19 abstentions.

<sup>10</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.211; adopted in Committee I on Oct. 31 by a vote of 73 to 0 with 7 abstentions.

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 401.

## Fund and Bank Take First Steps Toward Increase in Resources

*Following are statements made by Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, and Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, at the annual meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which were held at New Delhi, India, October 6-10. Secretary Anderson is governor of the fund and bank for the United States and was chairman of the U.S. delegation; Mr. Dillon is alternate governor for the United States.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. ANDERSON, OPENING SESSION, OCTOBER 6

On behalf of the United States delegation I should like first to thank the Prime Minister of India for the warm welcome which he has extended to the Boards of Governors. We have come to this meeting with a keen awareness of the profoundly important role which the Asian members of these two institutions are playing and will continue to play in the free world. In a vivid sense their needs and their aspirations epitomize the task of the bank and the fund.

It is the concern of all the Governments represented around this table to find ways of contributing more effectively to the well-being of all peoples. As members of these institutions we have expressed our conviction that free countries gain much by friendly and effective association in a common attack on the financial and economic problems which confront them. We are pleased to have the Governors for Malaya, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and Libya join with us here today in our consideration of these vital questions.

We also wish to express our appreciation of the able address by the chairman of the Boards of Governors [Jean van Houtte of Belgium], who has focused our attention on some of the basic

problems confronting our countries as they seek to develop their economies and expand their trade. We agree with him that sound internal finance is an essential condition to sound international economic policy. We should like to emphasize that economic development can and should go forward with noninflationary monetary policies so that the greatest benefits can be realized.

We in the United States Government find great encouragement in the increasingly effective way in which the fund and the bank have been performing their tasks. By improving the capacity of both institutions to operate throughout the free world, the member countries can greatly intensify their efforts to deal with the problems of economic development and financial and economic stability. It was to this end that the President of the United States and I recently exchanged letters in August<sup>1</sup> expressing the results of our thinking about international action which might fruitfully be taken. Pursuant to instructions which President Eisenhower gave to me, I have introduced resolutions at the Procedures Committee calling for a study of an increase in the resources of the bank and the fund.<sup>2</sup>

### Message of President Eisenhower

President Eisenhower has also asked me to read to you the following message:

One of the great opportunities which free nations have to be of service to one another—and to the larger cause of freedom itself—is that of fostering economic growth and well-being. A key element certainly is the timely provision of needed capital resources.

It is universally true, in my opinion, that governmental strength and social stability call for an economic environment which is both dynamic and financially sound. Among the principal elements in maintaining such an

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1958, p. 412.

<sup>2</sup> On Oct. 7 the fund voted to refer to its Executive Board the question of an increase in resources; the bank took similar action on Oct. 10.

economic basis for the free world are (1) a continuing growth in productive investment, international as well as domestic; (2) financial policies that will command the confidence of the public and assure the strength of currencies; and (3) mutually beneficial international trade and a constant effort to avoid hampering restrictions on the freedom of exchange transactions.

During the period of their operations the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund have performed an indispensable function in providing both short- and long-term financial assistance to various nations in need of it. There is widespread agreement as to the effectiveness of these two great institutions. A constructive increase in their resources would greatly enhance their usefulness to the free-world community.

These facts have prompted me to ask that consideration be given to certain measures designed to increase the capacity of both the bank and the fund so that they may better serve the rising needs of our free-world economy. It is my conviction that through these institutions we can give real encouragement and hope to all our member countries in the decade ahead. A progressively broadening attack upon some of the paramount economic problems of our time can be made possible by this program. I am confident that it can provide a new source of bright hope for the peoples of our world.

#### **International Development Association**

I should also like to say something about the International Development Association, to which President Eisenhower referred in his August letter. We are now studying this proposal in my own Government. I have no blueprint to offer at this time for such an association. Essentially, however, it would be an affiliate of the International Bank which would make long-term loans for economic development repayable in whole or in part in the currency of the borrowing country. As I have said, the United States Government is making its own studies of the feasibility and desirability of establishing an IDA. We hope that other countries will at the same time be giving thought to the matter, and we shall look forward to having informal conversations with you. If these informal studies and conversations lead to encouraging conclusions, it would be appropriate to undertake more formal study and negotiation, looking to the establishment of such an association.

We are meeting at a time in which the economic development of the free world is both encouraging and challenging. We must expect of our free economies that they will be at the same time dynamic and strongly resistant to both inflation and recession. We must expect also that they will

provide an environment which invites and encourages investment and that they will generate the savings which make investment possible. To my mind a most satisfying aspect of the experience of our countries, taken as a whole, in the years since the war has been the upward trend of world savings, production, and trade.

The bank and the fund have again demonstrated, in the past year of their operations, that they are well designed to contribute both to growth and to economic and financial stability. The fund has completed 2 years of operation on a very large scale indeed. The International Bank has also been going through the most intense period of activity in its history and in the last fiscal year made a larger volume of loan commitments than in any preceding year.

As indicated in the President's letter to me on August 22, it is our earnest hope that the Executive Boards of the fund and bank will consider promptly the question of the most practical means of increasing the quotas of the fund and capital of the bank. Various aspects will, of course, have to be dealt with in these studies, including the amount of the increases, the manner in which subscriptions and quota increases would be subscribed or paid, the extent of participation by the members as a whole, and so on. No doubt some weeks would be needed for the Executive Boards to complete the studies. However, I hope that the importance of the matter will be so evident as to create a sense of urgency and that by the end of December the Boards of Governors may expect to receive the reports from the two Executive Boards.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. ANDERSON ON FUND'S ANNUAL REPORT, OCTOBER 7**

Our distinguished Managing Director [Per Jacobsson] has read a thoughtful statement of the problems of the fund in its relation to the economies of its members. His great experience and gift for expression have enabled him to draw our attention vividly and with clear economic insight to the central questions to which we should all give our best efforts.

The annual report of the fund, which we are considering today, is worthy of its predecessors in its comprehensive and balanced analysis of changes in the world economy. Each year these reports have added to our understanding of the

financial relations and the trade and payments problems of the members of the free world. The report records the work which the fund has done in advising its members on exchange policies and related monetary issues and describes progress toward the agreed objective of freer trade and payments arrangements under conditions of exchange stability.

Prior to our last annual meeting there was a feeling of uncertainty about the course of foreign exchange rates. New and large balance-of-payments problems had emerged in several countries. Effective use of the fund's resources by the members during this period gave the world reassurance that there were means of assisting member countries in temporary balance-of-payments difficulties even when their deficits had become rather large. There had also been a disturbing amount of speculation in currencies and a shifting of international balances. Vigorous statements at the last annual meeting by the Governors for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and by the Managing Director, against the background of earlier governmental action, set at rest much of the speculation in the exchange markets.

#### **Financial Position of Industrial Members**

We meet here at New Delhi in a different atmosphere than the one which dominated our preceding meeting. The fund report has called attention to the generally strong international financial position of the industrial members of our two institutions. At the same time it recognizes that the year 1957-58 has brought with it a number of problems for many of the countries that depend upon the production of food and raw materials for their international earnings. This is of course related to three major factors, the overall trend of world trade, the rate of expansion in production of particular commodities, and the pressure of demand for imports in the less developed countries.

Insofar as developments in the United States affect the level of world trade, the present outlook appears to me to be encouraging. In fact during the past year our imports continued at a high level and our exports fell off quite decidedly. Thus, in fact, during this period the United States absorbed some of the impact of the leveling off in world trade in its own export accounts and acted as a sustaining factor on world trade as a whole

#### **U.S. Position on Price of Gold**

*Statement by Secretary Anderson<sup>1</sup>*

In view of some of the comments which have been made with respect to the price of gold, I should make clear that my Government firmly adheres to the position that the price of gold in United States dollars should remain unchanged. The assured interchangeability of gold and dollars at \$35 per ounce for the settlement of international accounts is a basic element of strength in the international financial structure. Moreover, we believe the excellent study prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund on "International Reserves and Liquidity" correctly emphasizes that attention should be focused upon the adequacy of resources to meet temporary imbalances of individual countries, rather than upon the subject of the price of gold.

<sup>1</sup> Released at New Delhi on Oct. 7, 1958.

through the maintenance of a high level of imports. The encouraging factors in our domestic economic situation, and the growing competition of other countries in world markets, lead us to anticipate a strengthening of the world trade and payments situation. It may be noted that in recent years the upward trend of increased official holdings of gold and dollar balances has continued. In addition there were sizable private balances which are used in the settlement of international accounts.

#### **Question of Increase in Quotas**

In the past 2 years we have had temporary balance-of-payments difficulties in the industrial countries and more recently similar problems among the less industrialized nations. It is in the light of these problems that certain suggestions have been put before this body by my Government. I refer to the proposal which we have made that the Executive Directors of the fund promptly consider the question of enlarging its resources through an increase in quotas.

In the last 2 fiscal years drawings on the fund have amounted to \$1.8 billion, and in addition at the end of this period there were outstanding standby commitments of \$884 million. As we look ahead to the next decade, the resources available to the fund to help countries meet temporary swings in their balances of payments may well be inadequate. In the light of our experience in re-

cent years we feel that practical means to provide an additional cushion of this character deserves the most prompt attention. This would afford an additional measure of confidence and thus help sustain world production and trade. A strengthened Monetary Fund would also give encouragement to the efforts which member countries are making to maintain or achieve convertibility.

If the Governors find themselves receptive to the suggestion that we have made, the Executive Board would, of course, consider a number of points. In addition to the more obvious questions, such as the amount of the increase in quotas and the form of payment, it would be well for the Board to consider ways in which more effective utilization can be made of the currencies of industrialized countries other than the United States.

We have been happy to note that drawings have recently been made in some currencies other than United States dollars. To the extent that the fund makes effective use of other currencies, its ability to play its sustaining role in world trade should be enhanced.

We have reason to be proud of the work of the fund, especially during the last 2 years. In addition to its financial assistance, the fund has courageously and devotedly undertaken to help its members deal with the difficult financial problems of internal inflation and exchange management. We look forward to a continuation of its patient and reliable guidance in this extremely important and rewarding field.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. DILLON ON BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT, OCTOBER 9**

It is especially fitting that we should be meeting at this time and in this place to review the problems of world economic development.

In the past year there has emerged in many of our countries a greater realization than ever before of the importance of economic development to the future of world civilization. With this greater realization there has also come a stirring of new ideas, in both official and private opinion, as to how development can best be promoted.

So today we meet in an invigorating atmosphere of creative effort. We meet in a climate of revived determination to discover and set in motion fresh initiatives to help speed the economic growth of the less developed countries.

That we meet in the capital of a great nation—India—which has become a hopeful symbol of economic development the world over, can only serve to underline the importance for all nations of our discussions.

In his address President [Eugene R.] Black [of the International Bank] has provided us with an excellent perspective of past accomplishments and future prospects. Certainly the bank's report of its operations during the last 12-month period is a record of outstanding achievement. The fact that the bank has been able to step up its rate of lending by over 75 percent in 1 year is evidence that the months and years which the bank and its borrowers have devoted to the careful planning of development projects are bearing rich fruit. It is important that the bank should continue to be in a financial position to meet the external capital requirements of its members for well-conceived development projects of this kind.

The extent to which the bank has become a mobilizer of private capital for international development is impressive. Through the sale of its bonds the bank has raised over \$2 billion in the private market. In addition the bank has sold over \$400 million from its portfolio to private investors. Bank loans have also made it possible for borrowers from the bank simultaneously to borrow from private sources, thus enlarging the total flow of international capital into development.

We have, of course, long since passed the point where the bank could rely significantly for its resources on the paid-in capital subscriptions of member governments. The scale of the bank's lending activities now depends almost entirely on its ability to raise funds in the private capital market.

In our review of the bank's activities I think we must pay special tribute to the constructive role which the bank is playing in the mediation of economic controversies between member governments. The satisfactory conclusion of arrangements for the payment of compensation arising out of the nationalization of the Suez Canal was due in no small measure to the bank's good offices. And we may hope that the bank's continuing efforts to promote an equitable arrangement for the division of the waters of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan will soon be successful.

Before turning from the bank's report, I would like to reciprocate, on behalf of the Government

of the United States, the kind observations in the report on the inauguration of relationships between the bank and our own Development Loan Fund. We look forward to an increasingly close association, so that the lending operations of both institutions will be strengthened.

I would also like to extend a word of welcome to the delegates of Malaya, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and Libya, who sit with us for the first time.

#### **Intensified Effort for Economic Development**

I wish, too, to commend the management and staff of the bank for the most successful year in the bank's history. As a member of this institution, my Government is indeed grateful that the bank is so well served by its capable and devoted officers and personnel.

Although we may rightly take satisfaction from what has already been accomplished in the field of economic development, our main concern must be for the future. For surely no greater challenge faces our governments and peoples than the problem of the economic development of the less developed areas. Poverty is still the lot of hundreds of millions of people. Economic growth still threatens to lag behind population increases in many lands. The human aspiration for economic progress fails to receive an adequate measure of fulfillment in wide areas of the world.

This is a distressing situation and a dangerous one. To attack it will require the best efforts of all of our members. It will require the most effective use of savings available from domestic and foreign sources. It will require vigorous activity by international economic institutions, including the bank, a greater effort to mobilize private resources, and more effective programs in the fields of education, health, technical cooperation, and scientific research, all of which are essential elements in the development process. Finally it will require continuing improvement in the fiscal and other policies of member governments which directly affect the development process. For if the developing countries are to achieve success in the vitally important task of accelerating capital formation at home and inducing the inflow of capital from abroad, they must provide a framework of governmental policy which is hospitable to new productive enterprise.

As we look to the future, it is the hope of my

Government that with the approval of our Congress the United States will be able to play its full part in an intensified cooperative effort of the nations on behalf of economic development. More specifically, it will be our objective:

1. To continue the vigorous and effective operation of our new Development Loan Fund, which commenced actual operations last January.

2. To continue the active lending operations of our Export-Import Bank.

3. To consider channeling some of our development assistance through regional development programs in areas where the governments concerned clearly desire such regional programs and are willing to join in their financial support, and where such programs appear to offer real advantages over bilateral programs.

4. To promote greater private initiative in economic development.

5. To intensify the participation of the United States in programs of technical cooperation, scientific cooperation, and health and education directed to the problems of economic development.

We hope that other member countries in the months ahead will reexamine their own programs and policies to the end that all of us may together take our full part in this effort. For this is not the task of a few countries only. It is a task for all.

It is in this context that the United States has introduced a resolution in the Procedures Committee proposing that we now consider the desirability of an increase in the capital of the bank. Certainly in any intensified effort to promote development the bank must continue to occupy a central position. In our view, an increase in the capital of the bank should be of sufficient magnitude to permit the bank to sustain its lending operations at a substantially expanded level over an extended period. We hope that the Board of Governors will approve the resolutions that we have introduced.

#### **Providing Capital on More Flexible Terms**

In his remarks at the opening session of this conference, Secretary Anderson referred to a proposal which is being studied in the United States Government for an International Development Association. While our Government does not as

yet have a detailed plan to submit with reference to such an association, we believe that any plan should take account of the following factors:

1. As is well known, loans from the International Bank have to be repaid in hard currencies. We understand that in a number of cases the bank has had to disapprove applications for loans, not because the development project involved was without merit but because repayment of the loan entirely in hard currency would have placed an undue strain on the borrowing country to repay. Now, if a percentage of the cost of such projects could come from a new institution affiliated with the bank which could make loans repayable at least in part with softer currencies, projects such as these might well become feasible.

2. Our suggestion that member governments of the bank study the possibility of an International Development Association does not mean that the United States would favor any lessening of the technical lending standards of the bank. Projects submitted to the International Development Association would be considered by precisely the same management and staff which now examines projects for the bank. In other words, while an International Development Association would provide capital on more flexible terms, in a balance-of-payments sense, than are now possible under International Bank standards, the establishment of an International Development Association as an affiliate of the bank would assure that the new lending authority would be in the hands of skilled financial management.

We ourselves are actively studying the ways and means in which an International Development Association might operate and hope to arrive at our own conclusions within the next few months. We would meanwhile welcome the thinking of our associates in the bank on this subject. It is of course essential to the success of such an institution that it receive broad financial support from the industrialized countries which are members of the International Bank. Only in this way could it become an effective international instrument for development. If encouraging conclusions emerge from these studies and informal conversations, it will then be appropriate to undertake more formal negotiations.

I would like to emphasize our belief that the difficult and complex problems of development re-

quire that all of us contribute together to their solution both financially and with our best thinking. Only in this way can we make progress toward the goal of a better living for all the peoples of the world. No one country and no small group of countries can do the job alone.

## **U.S. Pledges Contributions for U.N. Refugee Programs**

*Following are two statements made on October 27 by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, at meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole Assembly in which he pledged U.S. contributions to the two refugee programs, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.*

### **UNRWA PROGRAM**

U.S. delegation press release 3039

We are here today to announce, and to take note of, the pledges of voluntary contributions that our governments are prepared to make to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its next financial year. The 11th General Assembly called for this pledging session, recognizing the importance of knowing what financial resources will be available to the Palestine refugees over the next year before the annual report from the agency's director can be properly considered and acted upon. The consideration of that report by the Special Political Committee, before long, will again this year be the occasion for decisions that will have an important bearing on the future of the refugees. In order to reach sound decisions, the Special Political Committee will have to know what the agency's financial resources are likely to be over the near future. It is our job today to furnish that information.

For its part, the United States is pleased to announce a pledge for the United States fiscal year ending on June 30, 1959, of \$23 million. This includes \$18 million for the agency's relief program and \$5 million for its rehabilitation program. As in the past, the United States will make payments against this pledge to an extent

not exceeding 70 percent of total government contributions to UNRWA. In line with this policy the United States has already deposited in UNRWA's favor a contribution of \$11.5 million, representing one-half of its pledge.

During the past years the United States has been the foremost contributor to the programs that have made it possible to provide for the basic material needs of the unfortunate refugees from Palestine. It has made its contribution in recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem. These humanitarian considerations make the refugees a matter of deep concern to the whole world and are not directly related to political aspects of the problem, which are the direct concern of a relatively few governments.

In announcing this pledge the United States urges all others to contribute generously to the welfare of the refugees. However, the United States is interested primarily in a definitive solution of the refugee problem rather than merely in a continuation of relief and rehabilitation activities. To encourage steps in this direction on the part of those who bear direct responsibilities, the United States will make available up to \$3,750,000 for any resettlement or repatriation activities, provided they are initiated during the United States fiscal year ending on June 30, 1959. Contributions to the agency for such resettlement or repatriation activities will be made to the extent that they do not exceed 70 percent of total government contributions for these purposes.

In making this offer the United States realizes that little significant progress has been made in taking refugees off the relief rolls and in setting them up in conditions of self-support. The reasons for this have been described in past annual reports from the director of the agency. Nevertheless, the United States wishes to encourage resettlement and repatriation activities because it believes that it is increasingly important that steps be taken to lessen the refugees' dependence on relief, particularly in view of the approaching end of the agency's mandate.

The United States also believes that much can be achieved in further contributing to the welfare of the refugees if the host states are encouraged to enter more actively in directing relief and rehabilitation programs for the refugees. Accordingly, the United States repeats its offer, made here last year, to hold available to the director of the agency

\$300,000 for planning, or carrying out such plans, for the transfer of the agency's administrative functions to the host governments, as might be arranged between them and the director before June 30, 1959.

As I have indicated, we in the United States view the refugee problem primarily as a humanitarian one. We do not agree with those who hold that the humane aspects of this matter should be subordinated to political considerations. To us, the welfare of fellow human beings is paramount. However, while recognizing that there can be honest differences of opinion in this approach, we urge that all concerned, and most particularly Israel and the Arab states, bend every effort to provide for some more satisfactory means of dealing with the refugee problem than the mere continuation of the present system. Moreover, there is urgent need for planning against the day in 1960 when the agency's mandate runs out.

#### **HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROGRAM**

U.S. delegation press release 3040

It is a privilege for me to take part in this pledging conference which is concerned with the humanitarian work of the United Nations on behalf of refugees. The programs carried on by the High Commissioner are of direct and immediate benefit to people who are in great need and often in a state of helpless despair. It is impossible for the United Nations to meet all the needs of the refugees who have been uprooted by wars and ideological conflicts far beyond their control, but it is important for the United Nations to help wherever it can.

On behalf of the United States I am glad to announce a contribution of \$1.2 million to carry on the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the calendar year 1959, provided that this does not exceed one-third of the total contributions from all governments. It is our hope that many governments will contribute to this program. Even small contributions show the interest, sympathy, and concern of the people of other countries for those who are homeless and without a country.

The United States is gratified that the 4-year program of the United Nations Refugee Fund will terminate on schedule on December 31, 1958. The United States has contributed \$5,225,492 to this

fund during the past 4 years. It is anticipated that a further contribution of \$107,508 will be made during the remaining months of 1958, which will bring the United States contribution to \$5,333,000, or one-third of the \$16-million program originally approved.

The new programs of the High Commissioner, as provided for in the General Assembly resolution 1197 of last year, will continue to help not only the remaining European refugees still suffering from the aftermath of World War II but also others who are the helpless victims of current world tensions and upheavals. The programs will be discussed fully in Committee III [Social, Humanitarian and Cultural] during this Assembly. Today let us think only of the people who are in want and in dire distress rather than the political causes of their predicament. Let us give the United Nations refugee programs the high priority and financial support they deserve in the name of humanity.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### Economic and Social Council

Technical Assistance. Report of the Technical Assistance Committee. E/3175. July 30, 1958. 42 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Agreement concerning liaison between the International Labour Organization and the European Economic Community. E/3180. September 26, 1958. 5 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Report on the Extraordinary Session of the Committee of the Whole of the Economic Commission for Latin America, 1-3 October 1958. E/CN.12/AC.41/3. October 7, 1958. 9 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Proposed Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Meteorological Organization. E/3184. October 13, 1958. 6 pp. mimeo.

### Trusteeship Council

Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Elections in Togoland Under French Administration, Addendum. T/1392/Add. 1. August 13, 1958. 42 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Recess Appointments

The President on October 29 made the following recess appointments:

James C. H. Bonbright to be Ambassador to Sweden, vice Francis White, resigned. (For biographic details, see press release 652 dated October 29.)

O. Burke Elbrick to be Ambassador to Portugal, vice James C. H. Bonbright. (For biographic details, see press release 653 dated October 29.)

Livingston T. Merchant to be an Assistant Secretary of State, vice O. Burke Elbrick. (For biographic details, see press release 654 dated October 29.)

Richard B. Wigglesworth to be Ambassador to Canada, vice Livingston T. Merchant. (For biographic details, see press release 651 dated October 29.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Military Bases in the Philippines—Relinquishment of Manila Air Station.** TIAS 4083. 2 pp., with map. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, relating to agreements of March 14, 1947, June 18, 1957, and January 27, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila July 31, 1958. Entered into force July 31, 1958.

**Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact.** TIAS 4084. 2 pp. 5¢.

Between the United States of America and Other Governments—Signed at London July 28, 1958. Entered into force July 28, 1958.

**Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance.** TIAS 4085. 4 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States of America and the Sudan, interpreting agreement of March 31, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at Khartoum July 1 and 12, 1958.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4086. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Indonesia, amending agreement of March 2, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta May 22, 1958. Entered into force May 22, 1958.

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### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 27-November 2

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Release issued prior to October 27 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 632 of October 21.

No.	Date	Subject
644	10/27	Yugoslav credentials (rewrite).
645	10/27	Nepalese credentials (rewrite).
646	10/28	Dulles: "Canada and the United States: Mutual Interests and Ideals."
647	10/28	Nuclear weapons testing by Soviet Union (combined with No. 648).
648	10/28	Dulles: news conference.
*649	10/28	Educational exchange (Iran).
650	10/29	DLF loan to Paraguay.
*651	10/29	Wigglesworth appointed Ambassador to Canada (biographic details).
*652	10/29	Bonbright appointed Ambassador to Sweden (biographic details).
*653	10/29	Elbrick appointed Ambassador to Portugal (biographic details).
*654	10/29	Merchant appointed Assistant Secretary of State (biographic details).
655	10/30	Nuclear weapons testing by Soviet Union.
†656	10/31	Luxembourg credentials (rewrite).
†657	10/31	Greek credentials (rewrite).
†658	10/31	Bolivian credentials (rewrite).
†659	10/31	Danish credentials (rewrite).
*660	10/31	Educational exchange (Latin America).
661	10/31	U.S.-U.K. scientific panel to visit Africa.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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